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Water Rights, Water Quality, and
Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian Country
Robert T. Anderson*
In the seminal Indian water rights case, Winters v. United Slates
(1908), the Court posed this question: "The Indians had command of the
lands and the waters-command of all their beneficial use, whether kept for
hunting, 'and grazing roving herds of stock,' or turned to agriculture and
the arts of civilization. Did they give up all this?" The Court's answer was
no, and since then a large body of law has developed around Indian water
rights, although the primary focus has been on the amount of water reserved
for various tribal purposes. While Indian nations use property rights theo-
ries to protect their water resources from loss to non-Indian use, they also
deploy their inherent governmental authority through tribal water codes and
the federal Clean Water Act to protect water quality. As competition for wa-
ter resources grows and development pressures adversely affect water quality,
Indian Nations and their neighbors face new challenges in defining Indian
water rights for instream habitat protection and traditional consumptive
uses.
This article reviews the nature of Indian water rights-both on and off
reservations-and the use of tribal sovereignty to protect those rights in
terms of quantity and quality. The case law in this arena is sparse, and the
ability to predict an all-or-nothing litigated outcome is correspondingly lim-
ited. Under these circumstances, parties would be best off to default to the
usual presumptions recognizing inherent tribal authority over on-
reservation water resources and state authority outside of Indian country.
From this jurisdictional baseline, tribes, states and the United States
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should cooperate to ensure that a given regulatory regime protects water
quality and access to water.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When tribal territories were occupied primarily by Indians, and
the tribal land base was a consolidated unit of communally held
land, federal jurisdictional rules generally precluded any state au-
thority over tribe members and their territory.' Due to vacillating
1. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 595 (1832) (holding there was no state jurisdic-
Lion over a non-Indian present within Cherokee territory). See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (West
2014) (Indian country is the jurisdictional term used to describe the territory in which
tribal and federal law generally operate to the exclusion of state law); Alaska v. Native Vill.
of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 527 n.1 (1998).
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federal policies, however, non-Indians sometimes came to own
land within tribal territories, which resulted in an increasingly
complex web of jurisdictional rules. After surviving concerted fed-
eral efforts aimed at assimilation and termination, Indian nations
today assert regulatory jurisdiction over their entire territories,
which often include non-tribal citizens within their borders.2Alt-
hough sharply criticized by scholars, common law rules developed
by the Supreme Court since the 1980s have established a bias
against tribal jurisdiction over non-members on non-Indian land.3
In the Indian water rights arena, the Supreme Court has con-
sidered only a few cases quantifying the use of waters within and
passing through Indian lands.' As population increases and cli-
mate change affect the distribution of water in varying ways, the
potential for conflict over water use and quality protection will rise.
This article explores the mechanisms in place for the quantifica-
tion and regulation of water quality and quantity in Indian coun-
try, and suggests alternatives to litigation in order to accomplish
shared goals.
Part I of this article summarizes the basics of federal Indian
law with respect to property rights and sovereignty on Indian res-
ervations. Part III sets out the substantive framework of Indian wa-
ter rights under federal law, including both consumptive and non-
2. Kerr-McGee v. Navajo Nation, 471 U.S. 195, 198 (1985) ("In Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), we held that the "power to tax is an essential attribute
of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of self-government and territori-
al management.").
3. See, e.g., Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE LJ. 1012,
1086 (2015) ("[T] he Court has concocted all manner of restrictions on Native sovereignty,
grounded not in text but in problematic readings of history.") (citation omitted); see also
Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law fr Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian
Tribal Authority over Nonniembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999); Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and
Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1754 (1997);
David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court. in
Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573 (1996); Joseph Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1 (1991).
4. See Arizona v. California (Arizona II), 439 U.S. 419 (1979), amended by Arizona v.
California, 466 U.S. 144 (1984); Arizona v. California (Arizona 1), 373 U.S. 546 (1963)
(dealing primarily with the division of the waters of the Colorado River, but also quantify-
ing the water rights of several Indian reservations along the river); United States v. Powers,
305 U.S. 527 (1939) (construing water rights related to Indian allotments under 25 U.S.C.
§ 381); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908) (establishing the principle of
Indian reserved water rights based on federal law); see also Robert T. Anderson, Indian Wa-
ter Rights, Practical Reasoning, and Negotiated Settlements, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1133 (2010); Ju-
dith V. Royster, A Primer on Indian Water Rights, 30 TULSA L.J. 61 (1994); COHEN'S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 19.06 (2012), available at LexisNexis.
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consumptive uses. Part IV explores the law regarding tribal, state,
and federal jurisdiction over water use in Indian country. Part V
reviews federal administrative actions related to tribal regulatory
authority along with regulatory authority under the Clean Water
Act (CWA). This section includes the first analysis of a recent pro-
posal by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to interpret
the CWA as a delegation of federal regulatory authority to tribes
wishing to regulate water quality in Indian country. If the proposal
comes to pass, it could dramatically speed up the process for Indi-
an tribes to obtain regulatory authority under the CWA. It could
also eliminate uncertainty regarding major aspects of tribal regula-
tory authority, and thus provide a more stable platform for deci-
sion-making regarding water use in Indian country. Part VI offers
suggestions for inter-governmental cooperation to provide effec-
tive and rational processes for water management in Indian coun-
try.
II. INDIAN PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SOVEREIGNTY
The colonizing European nations' assertion of sovereignty over
"discovered" territories in the Western Hemisphere was based in
substantial part on claimed superior religious beliefs and the "un-
civilized" nature of indigenous peoples.5 Indian nations had rights
to use and occupy lands in their territories free of outside interfer-
ence.' As a practical matter, the indigenous tribes also possessed
superior numbers and corresponding military power over the
fledgling colonies, which led to an initially conciliatory approach
by the Europeans. As the colonists grew in numbers and European
disease decimated the Indian population, increased encroachment
on Indian lands sometimes led to violent confrontation.' This early
treaty period, which can be loosely characterized as extending into
5. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 73-74 (1990).
6. STEWART BANNER, How THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE
FRONTIER 35-43 (2005) (reviewing colonial recognition of Indian property rights).
7. See Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. Rev. 28, 40 (1947) (describing
a 1636 land transaction between Indians and European colonists "who were for many dec-
ades outnumbered by the Indians and unable to defeat any of the more powerful Indian
tribes in battle").
8. See DANIEL R. MANDELL, KING PHILIP'S WAR 3-4 (2010) (describing how English
property concepts led to conflicts between Indians and colonists); see also VINE DELORIA,
JR., INDIANS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 64-68 (1977) (describing how land encroach-
ment by white settlers led to military conflict between tribes and the United States in the
mid-1850s).
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the 1850s, was marked by agreements reflecting the treatment of
Indian nations in a fashion similar to international relations
among European Nations.' In the initial HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, Felix Cohen noted that for all but the last decade of
the treaty-making period, "terms familiar to modern international
diplomacy were used in the Indian treaties. . . Many provisions
show the international status of the Indian tribes, through clauses
relating to war, boundaries, passports, extradition, and foreign re-
lations."'"
Chief Justice Marshall, in the 1823 landmark decision, Johnson
v. M'Intosh, summarized the rights of the Native nations as follows:
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with
a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it
according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished,
and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whom-
soever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental
principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made
it.
While Johnson v. M'Intosh considered property rights of Indian
nations vis-A-vis the colonizing nations, the Court in 1831 ad-
dressed a controversy over Georgia's imprisonment of a mission-
ary, Sam Worcester, who had entered Cherokee territory with trib-
al consent, but allegedly in violation of state law. The Supreme
Court rejected Georgia's claim to legislative power over the Cher-
okee territory and those within it--both Indian and non-Indian. 2
The Court's analysis did not depend on property ownership; in-
stead, the Court reasoned that Georgia's efforts violated the "pre-
existing power of the nation to govern itself."'3 Because that right
was protected under federal law, Georgia's laws could not operate
upon the non-Indians present within the Cherokee territory. 4
9. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 4, at § 1.03.
10. FELIX S. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN Law 39
(1942); see also ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN
TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE 1600-1800 (1997).
11. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823). This tribal property interest is
commonly known as aboriginal title, or Indian title.
12. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 552 (1832).
13. Id. at562.
14. While the United States eventually asserted power to adjust the jurisdictional ar-
rangements of Indian nations, the courts developed an interpretive rule that tribal auton-
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That treatment declined as the United States subdued Indian
tribes through disease, steadily increasing population, and increas-
ing military might. The result was the cession of vast tribal territory
to the United States in exchange for various payments, services,
and the retention of smaller reservations. 5 The tribes did obtain
meaningful concessions in the form of reserved lands and im-
portant off-reservation hunting and fishing rights in treaty negotia-
tions, but the exchange of value was mostly one-sided. 6 In the late
19th Century, pressure increased to diminish the Indian land base
even further to aid non-Indian exploitation of natural resources
and settlement. In 1887, Congress passed the Dawes Act, or Gen-
eral Allotment Act, beginning the process to allow for the large-
scale transfer of communally held tribal lands to individual tribal
members and outright transfers of so-called "surplus lands" to the
federal government. 17 This had two effects. First, the Dawes Act al-
lowed Indian-owned allotments within reservation boundaries,
which were originally restricted from alienation for a twenty-five
year period, to be transferred to non-Indians." Second, the surplus
lands within reservation boundaries were opened to homesteading
and other forms of use under the laws encouraging settlement of
the public domain.' 9 This resulted in "checkerboard" patterns of
landownership within many Indian reservations in the western
United States.2" The Indian land base was reduced from nearly 140
million acres to 48 million acres." The transfers set the stage for a
long series of jurisdictional conflicts between Indian tribes, the
states, and non-Indians residing in "Indian country," which had no
twentieth-century statutory definition until 1948.22
only, sovereignty, and property rights remain intact until explicitly altered by Congress.
COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, § 2.02; Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014) ("[U]ntil Congress acts, the tribes retain' their
historic sovereign authority.").
15. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, § 1.03.
16. See Robert T. Anderson, Treaty Substitutes in the Modern Era, ch. 11, in THE POWER
OF PROMISES, RETHINKING INDIAN TREATIES IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST, (Alexandra Har-
mon ed. 2008); see also CHARLES F. WILKINSON, MESSAGES FROM FRANK'S LANDING: A STORY
OF SALMON, TREATIES, AND THE INDIAN WAY 11, 14 (2000); FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE
GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 134 (abr.
ed. Uni. of Nebraska Press 1986).
17. SeeJudith K. Royster, The Legacy of Allothent, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1 (1995).
18. Id. at 10-12.
19. Id. at 13-14.
20. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
21. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, sulra note 4, § 1.04.
22. Id. § 1.06. The phrase was defined in the early Trade and Intercourse Acts, but
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The modern definition of "Indian country" is found in 18
U.S.C. § 1151, and includes reservations, allotments, and depend-
ent Indian communities. The 1948 statute decoupled land owner-
ship from jurisdiction within reservations by defining Indian coun-
try as including "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation
under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwith-
standing the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way
running through the reservation."" The apparent effect of the
statute was to reverse several Supreme Court cases holding that
land owned in unrestricted fee simple within Indian reservation
boundaries was not considered Indian country, absent a particular
statutory or treaty exception.24 But this provision was not construed
by the Supreme Court until 1962 in Seymour v. Superintendent, when
the Court confirmed that Congress intended to avoid review of the
ownership of particular parcels of land in order to determine
which government would have jurisdiction over crimes within res-
ervation boundaries.2" Thus, after 1948, the nature of the title to an
individual parcel of land inside reservations had no bearing on its
jurisdictional treatment as Indian country.26
The extent of tribal authority over non-members on non-
member owned land steadily declined after 1981, as the Court res-
urrected the importance of property ownership within reservations
in the civil jurisdiction context.27 In that year, the Court decided
Montana v. United States, which effectively reversed the presump-
tion that tribes had full civil regulatory authority over all people
within Indian country." Instead, the Court developed an approach
that narrows tribal jurisdiction over non-members on non-member
land. 21t In 2008, the Court went even further, stating that the pre-
sumption against tribal authority over non-members "is particularly
the definition was dropped from the Revised Statutes in 1874. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, sulra note 4, § 3.04 (discussing R.S. § 5596 (effective June 22,
1874)).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2014).
24. See, e.g., Clairmont v. United States, 225 U.S. 551, 560 (1912) (concluding that
"the right of way had been completely withdrawn from the reservation by the surrender of
the Indian title and that in accordance with the repeated rulings of this court it was not
Indian country."); Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908) (finding allotment trans-
ferred to non-Indian ceased to be subject to federal Indian liquor laws).
25. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
26. Id. at 358.
27. See sources cited supra note 3.
28. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
29. Id. at 565-66. See supra note 3 for criticism of the Court's approach.
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strong when the nonmember's activity occurs on land owned in fee
simple by non-Indians-what we have called non-Indian fee
land. '3' Despite widespread academic criticism of the development
of this modern presumption, it seems that it is here to stay unless
there is a drastic change in the prevailing view of the Court.3 The
importance of this line of authority to Indian water rights is ex-
plored in Part III, after this article discusses the nature of property
rights in water.
III. INDIAN WATER RIGHTS ESTABLISHED UNDER FEDERAL LAW ARE
GENERALLY DISTINCT FROM AND SUPERIOR TO STATE WATER
RIGHTS
This section compares state rights under the prior appropria-
tion doctrine with tribal reserved rights established under federal
law. While federal law regarding water has significant aspects that
at times incorporate and also preempt state law, Congress has of-
ten deferred to state law when Indian rights are not at issue.32
However, Indian water rights generally have superior legal stand-
ing in relation to state rights based on original tribal ownership of
what is now the United States. This legal standing is further sup-
ported with treaties, statutes and Executive Orders that preempt
state law. Legal superiority notwithstanding, the fact that non-
Indians have enjoyed the use of waters previously reserved by and
for Indian tribes under federal law creates a powerful incentive for
policy-makers and courts to sometimes minimize senior tribal
rights. Many state rights were established during times when feder-
al policy was geared toward assimilating Indian peoples. Non-
Indian users were often aided by federal programs operated by the
Bureau of Reclamation to develop large irrigation projects in der-
ogation of tribal rights. These inconsistent policies and legal inter-
pretations have since fueled sharp and protracted conflicts.
30. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328
(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. For a comprehensive review of relevant cases and commentary, see Sarah Kra-
koff, Tribal Civil Jutisdiction over Nonmembers: A Practical Guide forJudges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV.
1187 (2010).
32. SeeL. OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, § 5.9 (West 2014) (discussing California
Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935)).
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A. State Water Law in the Western States
Water law in the western states is governed chiefly by the law of
"prior appropriation," 3 which developed to deal with arid condi-
tions unfamiliar to the common law of England and the moist cli-
mate of the eastern states." While some states have constitutions or
code provisions that declare water the property of the statej the
reality is that water in situ is not really "owned" by anyone. Rather,
any so-called state ownership reflects the public nature of water in
the sense that it is available for. all to use, subject to governmental
regulation.36 The question inevitably becomes who or what has the
right to use water for some purpose considered useful by society.
This notion of providing legal protection only for "beneficial uses"
of water remains the touchstone of western water law, but the defi-
nition of beneficial use has changed over time. Before the late
twentieth century, instream flow values of water were largely ig-
nored-aside from the need to maintain navigability.
The prior appropriation doctrine developed as a method of al-
locating surface water, but in many states it is applied to groundwa-
ter as well.37 In general, prior appropriation regimes reward the
first party who physically removes water from a stream for benefi-
cial use by granting that party a senior right to divert that amount
of water-first in time is thus first in right.31 In periods of shortage,
the date of initial diversion determines priority among competing
33. The states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Washington and Wyoming. See generally 1-11 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 11.04(a)
(LexisNexis 2009). Three of these states-California, Nebraska, and Oklahoma-also rec-
ognize some measure of riparian rights. See L. OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra
note 32, § 5:13. Most of the remaining states follow some form of the riparian water rights
system, which is premised on shared use rights by property owners adjacent to water bod-
ies. Most litigation regarding Indian water rights occurs in the western states, although the
issues have come up in at least one riparian jurisdiction. SeeJudith V. Royster, Winters in
the East. Tribal R served Rights to Water in the Riparian States, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'YREv. 169 (2000).
34. See WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, soupra note 33, § 11.01; Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch
Co., 6 Colo. 443, 449 (1882) ("The doctrine of priority of right by priority of appropriation
for agriculture is evoked, as we have seen, by the imperative necessity for artificial irriga-
tion of the soil.").
35. Waters and Water Rights, supra note 33, § 30.04.
36. Cf Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937) (holding Bureau of Reclamation's use of wa-
ter at a reclamation project does not vest the government with water rights, instead such
rights remain for use by landowners).
37. See WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 32, § 11.06 (c), § 12.02 (d).
38. SeeL. OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, suirta note 32, § 5:30.
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use rights. A water right holder may lose her right by abandon-
ment, or by forfeiture, which is the unexcused failure to use the
water for a specified period of time under state law.39 In short,
states generally require continuous beneficial use of the water to
maintain the right.
Western water users and politicians zealously defend state prior
appropriation systems and rights, although practical adherence to
the doctrine is suspect"' The same reluctance to embrace change,
or enforce the doctrine strictly, operates as a powerful incentive to
prevent the use of senior Indian rights ignored or deliberately ne-
glected by the United States government. Historically non-Indian
users have readily used Indian water-both on and off reserva-
tions-creating a situation where superior Indian legal rights and
moral claims must overcome powerful countervailing interests.4'
For a variety of reasons, Indian reserved rights do not depend
on putting water to beneficial use-but are recognized as part of a
tribe's original ownership of reservation territory, or as established
by federal actions setting aside tribal territory. In either case, tribal
water rights generally are senior in priority to non-Indian uses es-
tablished under state prior appropriation law as such rights are
ranked by date of first use.
39. Id. §§ 5:88-5:90.
40. John D. Leshy, Notes on a Progressive National Water Policy, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv.
133, 139 (2009). See also Reed D, Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo: Protecting Established
Water Uses in the Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of Prior Appropriation, 28 ENVTL. L. 881,
890 (1998) ("With rare exceptions, states abide by the following basic precepts: 1) en-
force the law only when necessary, 2) change the -law where needed to protect existing
uses, 3) avoid the position of having to curtail established water uses, and 4) prevent
instream demands from threatening existing out-of-stream uses."); A. Dan Tarlock, Prior
Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. REV. 881 (2000); Charles F. Wilkinson,
In Memoria: Prior Apprqniation 1848-1991, 21 ENvTL. L. xxix, xxxiv (1991) ("State law real-
ly is no law."); John Leshy, The Prior Appropriation Doctrine of Water Law in the West: An Em-
peror with Few Clothes, 29J. OF THE WEST 5 (1990) ("[C]lassic prior-appropriation doctrine
has become so riddled with exceptions and limitations as to lose its descriptive utility.");
Michael V. McIntire, The Disparity Between State Water Rights Records and Actual Water Use Pat-
terns: "I Wonder Where the Water Went?," 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23, 26 ("Most of the west-
ern states experienced significant deviations between the actual practices of water users in
the field and the information recorded in the office of the water administration offi-
cials.").
41. See DANIEL McCOOL, NATIVE WATERS: CONTEMPORARY INDIAN WATER
SETTLEMENTS AND THE SECOND TREATY ERA 36 (2002) (noting the "stark contrast between
the federal government's abject parsimony when funding Indian water development and
its gratuitous generosity when funding non-Indian development").
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B. Indian Reserved Water Rights Include Consumptive and Non-
Consumptive Uses Created by Original Indian Ownership, or
Implication
This section sets out the legal and moral arguments accepted
by the courts as the foundation of the Indian reserved rights doc-
trine, and consequent conflicts with state water law. Indian aborig-
inal title includes the right of indigenous peoples to use and occu-
py their land, and is valid against all parties but the United States. 2
But what about Indian water rights? The Indian tribes existed be-
fore the establishment of the United States, or of any state for that
matter. Did their aboriginal property rights include water? If so,
how much? And was there acknowledgement of rights to water as a
matter of federal law? As shown below, Indian water rights have a
strong pedigree, and are recognized as arising: 1) out of original
Indian ownership of their territories; and 2) from federal actions
in the form of treaties, statutes, and Executive Orders setting aside
Indian reservations. In marked contrast to early state law, these
reservations of land included, implied promises of sufficient water
for myriad uses-including irrigation, fish and wildlife habitat pro-
tection, and the development of permanent homelands.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the feder-
al government commenced a policy of assimilating Indians into
the general population with an expectation that traditional modes
of life and decision-making would fall by the wayside. 3 Establishing
reservation homelands as. a base for agricultural economies was
one important part of the federal assimilation policy." In order to
obtain tribal consent to land cessions to the United States, many
tribes secured treaty guarantees of off-reservation hunting and fish-
ing rights. In United States v. Winans, the Supreme Court consid-
ered the rights of Yakama Nation members to cross privately
owned land in order to exercise off-reservation treaty rights.45 The
Confederated Tribes of the Yakama Reservation had ceded most of
their aboriginal land to the United States in 1855 in exchange for
exclusive rights to occupy a smaller reservation, in addition to "the
42. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823).
43. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, § 1.04. At the same
time, Indians and their lands generally remained beyond the reach of state law-including
state water law. Id. § 6.01(2).
44. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, S. EXEC. Doc. NO. 31-1, at
35-45 (Nov. 27, 1850) (extolling the virtues of agricultural labor).
45. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common
with the citizens of the Territory. ' ' 46 Private landowners argued that
since their patents from the United States government said noth-
ing about an easement for access to Indian fishing sites on the
now-private land, one should not be implied. The Court rejected
the argument because a reserved right to fish would be meaning-
less without access to fishing sites. The Court found that the treaty
"imposed a servitude upon every piece of land as though described
therein. '47 This followed from the principle that Indian treaties are
"not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from
them-a reservation of those not granted."" This implied reserva-
tion theory quickly ran up against the state-based rights of non-
Indian water users.
In Winters v. United States, the Supreme Court held that when
the federal government set aside land for the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation in Montana, it impliedly reserved sufficient water from
the Milk River to fulfill its purpose for creating the reservation,
which was to provide a permanent tribal homeland with an agricul-
tural economy.4' Nonetheless, non-Indians who had settled up-
stream of the reservation claimed paramount rights to use water
from the Milk River based on the state law of prior appropriation.
If the state law of prior appropriation applied, the Fort Belknap
Indian water rights would apparently be junior to the rights of the
non-Indian settlers. The United States-as trustee to the tribes-
sued the non-Indians, arguing that Congress, in 1888, had reserved
rights to sufficient water under prior appropriation, riparian, or
"other law," to fulfill the purpose of establishing the reservation."
46. Treaty with the Yakamas, art. 3, 1855, 12 Stat. 951. The phrase "usual and accus-
tomed grounds and stations" was used in a number of treaties entered into between the
United States and Pacific Northwest tribes. It simply refers to the locations at which tribal
members customarily fished. FAY G. COHEN, TREATIES ON TRIAL: THE CONTINUING
CONTROVERSY OVER NORTHWEST INDIAN FISHING RIGHTS 37-38 (1986).
47. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381 ("The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy
was a part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which there was
not a shadow of impediment, and which were not much less necessary to the existence of
the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.").
48. Id.
49. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. at 577. For a comprehensive review of the In-
dian reserved rights doctrine, see COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note
4, § 19.03.
50. The Complaint alleged that "notwithstanding the riparian and other rights of
[the United States] and of the said Indians to the uninterrupted flow of the waters of all
the waters of said Milk river," the defendants, in 1900, wrongfully built dams and reservoirs
and diverted the waters of the river from its channel, and thus deprived the United States
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The non-Indian irrigators forcefully argued that their uses began
prior to the Indian uses (except for a small uncontested amount),
and that their investments and rights would be rendered valueless.
The argument as constructed by the court of appeals was simple
and logical: if the Indians were to become farmers as contemplat-
ed by the 1888 agreement creating the reservation, they would
need water, and that water was reserved by the agreement.5 ' The
Supreme Court affirmed by holding that the federal government
had the power to exempt waters from appropriation under state
water law, and that the United States intended to reserve the wa-
ters of the Milk River to fulfill the purposes of the agreement be-
tween the Indians and the United States.52 The Court accordingly
upheld an injunction limiting non-Indian use to the extent it inter-
fered with the current needs of the tribes.
The ruling in Winters was a departure from the federal gov-
ernment's general deference to state water law in the arid West.
53
However, the open-ended nature of the tribes' reserved water
rights became a source of discontent among the western states and
non-Indian water users, because Indian reserved rights could effec-
tively get to the front of the line ahead of state water rights. 54 Thus,
state-law appropriators could establish rights relative to one anoth-
er but never be certain if an up- or downstream Indian tribe might
have a senior reserved right, and if so, of its quantity. The fear
and the Indians of the use of water from the river. Bill of Complaint 14, Winters v. Unit-
ed States, 143 F. 740 (9th Cir. 1906) (No. 1336). See JOHN SHURTS, INDIAN RESERVED
WATER RIGHTS: THE WINTERS DOCTRINE IN ITS SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT, 1880s-1930s
69-75 (2000) (characterizing the United States' Complaint as encompassing facts to sup-
port prior appropriation, riparian, or reserved rights theories).
51. Winters, 143 F. at 749.
52. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW, supra note 4, § 19.02.
53. See David H. Getches, The Unsettling of the West: flow Indiarn Got the Best Water
Rights, 99 MICH L. REV. 1473, 1481-83 (2001) (book review) (explaining that despite rem-
nants of riparianism in the West, the prior appropriation doctrine was the overwhelming
rule in the western states by 1908); see ahoWilliam H. Hunt, Law of Water Rights, 17 YALE L.
J. 585, 586 (1908) ("Furthermore, the courts have steadily held that the right to the
use of running water may be had only for beneficial uses, and can be acquired
only by actual appropriation. This tendency on the part of judicial decision has be-
come more pronounced as the settlement of the country has advanced; and as it
has become more apparent that the actual user of water is the person who should
be favored, as against one who would hold or appropriate without actual use.").
54. This is because the Indian rights are established by operation of law and do not
depend on withdrawing water form a source and applying it to a beneficial use as under
state prior appropriation law. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, stutpra note
4, § 19.03(3).
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among these users was that the exercise of Indian reserved rights
might destroy or undermine their investments in infrastructure to
utilize water.55 Some early to mid-twentieth century cases in lower
federal courts also recognized implied Indian reserved water rights
but did not quantify the amount reserved with any finality.56 While
Winters set out the basic parameters of the Indian reserved water
rights doctrine, there have been few other Supreme Court cases
dealing with the nature of the rights. 5 7 It was not until 1963 in Ari-
zona v. California that the Supreme Court devised a methodology
for fully quantifying Indian reserved rights to deal with the open-
ended decree problem.
The Arizona v. California decision primarily involved the divi-
sion of the water among the Colorado River Basin states, but the
Supreme Court also used the case as a vehicle to weigh in on the
preferred method of quantification of Indian reserved water
rights. 58 The United States intervened on behalf of several Colora-
do River Indian tribes and asserted claims for full and permanent
allocations of water rights to the tribes. 5' The claims went a step
beyond the ruling of Winters, which had resulted in an injunction
against certain uses but had left the tribes with an open-ended de-
cree. The Supreme Court agreed that a final quantification was de-
sirable and endorsed the practicably irrigable acreage (PIA) meth-
55. There was in fact little interference with state,law rights due to the general lack
of development of Indian water rights on the ground. The National Water Commission in
1973 concluded that "[i]n the history of the United States Government's treatment of In-
dian tribes, its failure to protect Indian water rights for use on the reservations it set aside
for them is one of the sorrier chapters." NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE
FUTURE-FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 475
(1973). See also Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights and the Federal Trust Responsibility,
46 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 399, 414-18 (2006) (describing historical federal treatment of Indian
water rights).
56. See Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908); United States v.
Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956) (both cases recognizing reserved
rights that could increase as tribal needs expanded).
57. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 532 (1939) (finding that successors to al-
lotment owners acquired right to use a portion of the water right originally reserved by a
tribe under the Winters doctrine). The only other Supreme Court cases on the merits of
Indian water rights are Winters and Arizona v. California, discussed in note 4, supra. See supra
text accompanying notes 15-22 (discussing allotment policy).
58. Arizona v. California (Arizona 1), 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963).
59. Id. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 608-09, (1983) ("[The] United States
intervened, seeking water rights on behalf of various federal establishments, including the
reservations of five Indian tribes-the Colorado River Indian Tribes, Fort Mojave Indian
Tribe, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, Cocopah Indian Tribe, and Fort Yuma (Quechan) Indi-
an Tribe.").
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od'( which allowed a quantification of reserved water rights for the
present and future needs of the Indian reservations adjacent to or
near the river. In general, the PIA test evaluates tribal lands for
their irrigation potential in an economically feasible manner to ar-
rive at a final quantification for reservations with an agricultural
purpose.6' In a later phase of the case, the Court also approved the
use of agricultural water for non-agricultural uses if the tribes
wished." The only other Indian water rights case to reach the
Court on the merits was Wyoming v. United States, which involved
Wyoming's general adjudication of water rights to the Big Horn
River, including the rights of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes."
Although review was granted to consider the Wyoming Supreme
Court's application of the PIA standard, the equally divided Court
did not issue an opinion on the matter.6' Several lower federal
courts and state courts, however, have considered uses beyond ag-
riculture.
In litigation involving the Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation in the early 1980s, the Ninth Circuit held that
60. Id. ("We have concluded, as did the Master, that the only feasible and fair way by
which reserved water for the reservations can be measured is irrigable acreage.").
61. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, § 19.03 [5].
62. Arizona v. California (A-rizona It), 439 U.S. 419, 422-23 (1979), amended by Arizona
v. California, 466 U.S. 144 (1984) ("The foregoing reference to a quantity of water neces-
sary to supply consumptive use required for irrigation ... shall constitute the means of de-
termining quantity of adjudicated water rights ... but shall not constitute a restriction of
the usage of them to irrigation or other agricultural application."); see Colville Confeder-
ated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 49 (9th Cir. 1981) ("use of reserved water is not limited
to fulfilling the original purposes of the reservation"); COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, at 1225 (discussing principles behind change in use rule).
63. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989); seeAndrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F.
Lin, A Misplaced Sensitivity: T"he Draft Opinions in Wyoming v. Uniled States, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev.
683, 703 (1997) ("On January 23, 1989, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
whether the Wyoming Supreme Court had erred in applying the PIA standard to calculate
the Indian reserved water rights."). The Wyoming state courts assumed jurisdiction pursu-
ant to the McCarran Amendment. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1952). That statute waives the United
States' sovereign immunity in state general stream adjudications such that state courts ob-
tain jurisdiction to quantify federal and Indian water rights. See Arizona v. San Carlos
Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 548-49 (1983). The grant ofjurisdiction to adjudicate federal
and Indian reserved rights does not include state administrative authority to regulate Indi-
an use of the reserved right. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, at
1238-39.
64. Wyoming, 492 U.S. at 407. The Wyoming Supreme Court had awarded what the
irrigation community considered a generous amount of water for present and future use
under the PIA standard. See Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Senoilivity: The
lhafi Opinions in Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 683, 696, 702 n.133
(1997).
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the Tribes reserved water for both agricultural and fisheries pur-
poses. 5 The court stated that the "[t~he general purpose [of the
reservation], to provide a home for the Indians, is a broad one and
must be liberally construed. We are mindful that the reservation
was created for the Indians, not for the benefit of the govern-
ment."66 The court concluded that the Colville reservation, like
most reservations in the West, had been set aside for agricultural
purposes. But due to the tribe's demonstrated traditional reliance
on fisheries resources, the court also found that water needed to
support tribal fisheries was reserved.67 Just two years later, in United
States v. Adair, the Ninth Circuit considered claims by the United
States and the Klamath Tribes to water needed to maintain in-
stream flows and lake levels to protect treaty rights to fish, wildlife,
and plants.6' The court applied the Winans rationale in evaluating
the Klamath Tribe's water rights:
[T]he 1864 Treaty [with the Klamaths] is a recognition of the
Tribe's aboriginal water rights and a confirmation to the Tribe of
a continued water right to support its hunting and fishing life-
style on the Klamath Reservation. Such water rights necessarily
carry a priority date of time immemorial. The rights were not
created by the 1864 Treaty, rather, the treaty confirmed the con-
tinued existence of these rights.6'9
The Klamath Tribes also claimed reserved water to provide ir-
rigation for individual Indians who had received allotments of
tribal land. The court stated that "New Mexico and Cappaert, while
not directly applicable to Winters doctrine rights on Indian reserva-
tions [because they involve only federal lands], establish[ed] sev-
eral useful guidelines."70 The court explained, "[w]hile the pur-
65. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47-49 (9th Cir. 1981). The
Executive Order creating the reservation provided: "It is hereby ordered that.., the coun-
try bounded on the east and south by the Columbia River, on the west by the Okanagan
River, and on the north by the British possessions, be, and the same is hereby, set apart as
a reservation for said Indians, and for such other Indians as the Department of the Interi-
or may see fit to locate thereon." Executive Order of July 2, 1872, reprinted in 1 CHARLESJ.
KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAiRS AND TREATIES, 916 (2d ed. 1924).
66. Walton, 647 F.2d at 47 (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 48.
68. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1984).
69. Id. at 1414, (citing Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658, 678-81 (1979)).
70. Id. (citation omitted).
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pose for which the federal government reserves other types of
lands may be strictly construed .... the purposes of Indian reserva-
tions are necessarily entitled to broader interpretation if the goal
of Indian self-sufficiency is to be attained."'" On remand to the
state court system for quantification, there were years of litigation
regarding the state system's merit under the McCarran Amend-
ment, culminating in a decision permitting the Oregon courts to
proceed with the adjudication of the Klamath River Basin.72 State
courts exercising their jurisdiction under the McCarran Amend-
ment 7" have also applied the reserved rights doctrine in a number
of cases involving water for fisheries. In State Department of Ecology v.
Yakima Reservation Irrigation District, the Washington Supreme
Court recognized Indian reserved rights to instream flows for fish-
eries habitat protection, " and later affirmed a trial court ruling
that the Yakima reserved right to instream flows extends to off-
reservation waters necessary to provide fisheries habitat.
75
Decisions from the Arizona Supreme Court and the Wyoming
Supreme Court present an interesting contrast to each other, and
take approaches that vary from the Ninth Circuit decisions in Col-
71. Id. at 1408 n. 13, (quoting WILLIAM C. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 24546
(1981)).
72. See United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 767-69 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding state
jurisdiction over litigation effected pursuant to initial administrative adjudication scheme
despite exclusion of groundwater and being limited to pre-1908 water rights); Brief of
United States in Opposition to Petition for Cert. at 10, Klamath Tribe v. State of Oregon,
Dep't of Water Res., 1995 WL 17047729.
73. See 43 U.S.C. §,666 (1952).
74. State Dep't of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrigation Dist, 850 P.2d 1306, 1317
(Wash. 1993) (en bane) ("All of the parties to this litigation agree that the Yakima Indians
are entitled to water for irrigation purposes and, at least at one time, were entitled to water
for the preservation of fishing rights. The disagreement here is the extent of the treaty
rights remaining."); see, e.g., Joint Board of Control of Flathead Irrigation Dist. v. United
States, 832 F.2d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1987) (reversing trial court's refusal to issue injunc-
tion to protect tribal water rights for fish); Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley
Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding district court acted appropriately
in ordering release of water to protect habitat for the fishery); United States v. Anderson,
591 F. Stipp. 1, 5 (E.D. Wash. 1982), affd in part & rev'd in part, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir.
1984) (recognizing a reserved tribal water right for water needed to maintain favorable
temperature conditions to support the fishery); State ex 7l. Greely v. Confederated Salish
& Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 764-66 (Mont. 1985) (recog-
nizing that tribal reserved rights may include water for fisheries as well as agriculture and
other purposes).
75. In reYakima River Drainage Basin, 296 P.3d 835, 840 (Wash. 2013) (en bane)
("[The] nation also has a right that dates fiom time immemorial to adequate water to sus-
tain fish and other aquatic life in Ahtanum Creek [which extends beyond reservation
lands])."
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viUle and Adair. In the general stream adjudication of the Gila Riv-
er, the Arizona Supreme Court endorsed a "homeland" theory that
used a broad interpretive approach looking to the general purpose
behind the establishment of Indian reservations.76 The court con-
cluded that the essential purpose of Indian reservations is to pro-
vide Indian tribes with a permanent home and abiding place with
a "livable" environment, and prescribed a multi-factor test for as-
certaining the amount of water reserved.7 It expressed concern,
however, that awarding "too much water" to tribes under the PIA
analysis would be inconsistent with a "minimal need" approach it
borrowed from the non-Indian federal reserved water cases.78 Rel-
egating the PIA measure to a matter merely for consideration as
part of a total award focused on "minimal need" seems to invite
state trial courts to balance reserved rights against non-Indian uses
to avoid adverse effects on state water rights7-an approach re-
jected by the Supreme Court in Cappaert v. United States.8" Leading
76. In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys-
tem, 35 P.3d 68, 74, 77-79 (Ariz. 2001) [hereinafter Gila River]. The Gila River decision
involved several reservations in Arizona that had been established in part by treaty and in
part by Executive Orders. Id. at 74. For identification of the tribes involved see In re De-
termination of Conflicting Rights to Use of Water from Salt River Above Granite Reef
Dam, 484 F. Supp. 778, 784 (D. Ariz. 1980), rev'd sub norn.; San Carlos Apache Tribe of
Ariz. v. State of Ariz., 668 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1982), revd sub nom. Ariz. v. San Carlos
Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545 (1983) (holding that the federal court should abstain
from exercising jurisdiction and that Indian water rights could be determined in state
court proceedings under the McCarran Amendment).
77. Gila River, 35 P.3d at 79-81.
78. Id. at 78 ("Another concern with PIA is that it forces tribes to pretend to be
farmers in an era when 'large agricultural projects . . .are risky, marginal enterprises."')
(quoting Martha C. Franks, The Uses f the Pacticably Irrigable Acreage Standard in the Quanti-
fication of Reserved Water Rights, 31 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 549, 578 (1991)).
79. The Arizona Supreme Court stated:
The PTA standard also potentially frustrates the requirement that federally re-
served water rights be tailored to minimal need. Rather than focusing on what is
necessary to fulfill a reservation's overall design, PIA awards what may be an
overabundance of water by including every irrigable acre of land in the equation.
... The court's function is to determine the amount of water necessary to effec-
tuate this [homeland] purpose, tailored to the reservation's minimal need. We
believe that such a minimalist approach demonstrates appropriate sensitivity and
consideration of existing users' water rights, and at the same time provides a re-
alistic basis for measuring tribal entitlements.
Gila River, 35 P.3d at 79, 81.
80. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1976) ("Nevada argues that the
cases establishing the doctrine of federally reserved water rights articulate an equitable
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commentators also share pessimism regarding the wisdom of the
Arizona approach, 8 and it remains to be seen whether it will ever
be implemented. 2
The Wyoming Supreme Court, on the other hand, adhered
strictly to the PIA standard in its Big Horn decision. It rejected
claims for other uses such as instream flows for fisheries or mineral
and industrial development. 3 The court's approach, however,
seems incorrect in its narrow construction of the purposes of a res-
ervation by excluding water for fisheries, industrial, and other
purposes. 4 While the court did hold that municipal, domestic, and
commercial uses were subsumed within the agricultural right, 5 it
later compounded its erroneously narrow treaty construction by
refusing to permit the tribe to change the use of a portion of its
agricultural water to instream flows to enhance fisheries habitat."
As I have noted elsewhere, this climate of uncertainty in litigation
outcomes can lead tribes and states to forge settlements that may
be approved by Congress. 7
Quantification of Indian reserved water rights can be a gargan-
tuan task. Most of the cases discussed above were brought by the
United States as trustee on behalf of tribes, or initiated as general
stream adjudications by states in their own court systems. It often
takes decades for litigation to run its course-a course that may be
interrupted by failed attempts to negotiate a settlement. Even
when the parties can reach a settlement, Congress may not be will-
ing to take action to ratify the agreement or provide funds needed
doctrine calling for a balancing of competing interests. However, an examination of those
cases shows they do not analyze the doctrine in terms of a balancing test.").
81. WILLL4m C. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 500-01 (6th ed. 2015); COHEN'S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, sn/ira note 4, § 19.03 [5] (b) ("Although the Arizona
court's approach avoids the problems inherent in PIA, its focus on minimal needs ulti-
mately may leave some tribes with less water than the imperfect PIA standard.").
82. In 2004, the claims of several Arizona tribes involved in the litigation were set
tled. Arizona Water Settlements Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-451, 118 Stat. 3478. See In re
the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System, 224 P.3d 178
(Ariz. 2010) (en banc) (approving Gila River Indian Community Settlement).
83. In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 753 P.2d 76, 98-99 (Wyo. 1988) (applying the primary purpose test strictly), affd by
an equally dividFd court sub nor., Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Big Horn] .
84. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, § 19.03[4].
85. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 99.
86. In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992).
87. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 1153-54.
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to make the deal work."8 The tribes and the United States as trustee
have focused on litigation and settlements to quantify tribal rights.
There are twenty-seven settlements confirmed by Congress," and
there are another thirty-two tribes with federal settlement teams
appointed to participate in negotiations that take place in a litiga-
tion context."0 Leaving aside the 226 Alaska tribes, there are rough-
ly 250 tribes with unquantified water rights.9' State law water users,
states, Indian tribes, and the United States may not always engage
in further litigation to resolve quantification issues, but if they do,
it is always a daunting task.
The next Part adds to the complexity with a review of tribal
regulatory power over reservation water resources-an area that
has received almost no attention from the courts and little from
the commentators.
IV. TRIBALJURISDICTION OVER NON-MEMBERS IN THE WATER USE
CONTEXT-THE WALTON AND ANDERSON CASES.
Although Indian nations have expansive, inherent authority
over their own members within Indian country92 and over non-
members on Indian lands, civil jurisdiction over non-members has
been curtailed in recent years.93 Since 1981, tribal jurisdiction over
non-members has been determined, in part, by the tribal member
status of the party involved and the nature of the title to the land
within Indian country.94 In Montana v. United States, the Supreme
88. See id. at 1153-59.
89. SeeCOHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDAN LAW, supra note 4, §19.05.
90. Federal Indian Water Rights Negotiation Teams for Indian Water Rights Settle-
ments (February 2015), (on file with Secretary's Indian Water Rights Office, Department
of the Interior, 1849 C Street, Washington D.C.). There are thirty-two tribes whose claims
were involved at least in part in the settlements. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 1161-63.
91. This calculation is based on the fact that there are 329 tribes in the lower 48
states and the author's calculation of thirty-two tribes that are parties to settlements and no
more than ten others with fully litigated rights.
92. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978).
93. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 4, § 6.02 [2].
94. See also Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 465 (1989) (affirming and rejecting, in plurality opinions, tribal zoning authority
over non-Indian fee land based on the "Indian" character of the land). Compare Washing-
ton v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1980) (hold-
ing tribe may tax non-member purchasers of cigarettes from tribal members on tribal
lands), and Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1981) (finding tribe may regu-
late non-member hunting and fishing on tribal land), and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 136 (1982) (holding tribe may tax oil company doing business on
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Court established a presumption that tribes lack regulatory juris-
diction over non-members on non-member fee land.' Exceptions
to this federal common law rule may be invoked when there is: 1)
consent from the non-member; or 2) non-member conduct that
has a significant effect on the health, welfare, or economy of the
tribe.9'
However, application of the Montana rule in the on-reservation
water regulatory context is uncertain because waters subject to re-
served rights are not equivalent to non-member fee lands. Even if
the rule were applicable, tribal interests in protecting on-
reservation water resources would seem to satisfy even the most
stringent application of the test employed by the Supreme Court
in recent years. The Montana test has largely been applied to regu-
lation of non-member activity on fee simple land. 7 Rivers and lakes
traversing reservations are different. Indian tribes have property
interests in the waters of their reservations for agricultural, munic-
ipal, and domestic uses, and for instream flows to protect fish habi-
tat.9" The inchoate property right of the tribe in reservation waters
provides a basis for regulatory authority over such waters. ' 9 Accord-
tribal land), and Kerr-McGee v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195, 201 (1985) (finding tribe may
tax oil company doing business on tribal land), with Montana, 450 U.S. at 566 (1981)
(tribe may not regulate non-member hunting and fishing on non-Indian fee land), and
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997) (recognizing no tribal jurisdiction to
adjudicate tort claim arising on fee land between non-consenting non-members), and At-
kinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647 (2001) (finding no tribal jurisdiction to
tax nonmember hotel guests), and Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 347 (2001) (finding no
tribal jurisdiction to adjudicate tort claim against state officer executing process for al-
leged off-reservation crime), and Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle
Co., 554 U.S. 316, 320 (2008) (holding no jurisdiction to adjudicate discrimination claim
against non-Indian over sale of fee land to another non-Indian).
95. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 566 (1981).
96. Id. The exceptions have been narrowly construed. See Atkinson Trading Co. v.
Shirley, 532 U.S. at 656-58; Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Civil Juri.diction over Nonmenbers: A Practi-
cal GuidefirJudges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1187, 1215 (2010).
97. The lone exception is Hicks, 553 U.S. at 358 n.2 (2001), which was limited to a
situation involving an attempt to assert jurisdiction over a state police officer investigating
an off-reservation crime.
98. See supra Part II.B.
99. Lakes and rivers subject to Indian reserved water rights are not "fee simple
lands." Cf Katie John v. United States, 720 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that
federal reserved water rights in various federal conservation system units (CSUs) in Alaska
were property interests in the water column within and adjacent to CSUs and, the United
States accordingly possessed regulatory jurisdiction over the water, which is federal "public
land" by virtue of the reserved rights), cert. denied sub nom. Alaska v. Jewell, 134 S. Ct. 1759
(2014). Tribes now also assert ownership and regulatory power over reservation waters as a
matter of tribal law. See, e.g., Navajo Nation Code Ann. tit. 22 § 1103 ("The Navajo Nation
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ingly, it is a situation more like the cases involving tribal lands than
the Montana line of cases,' 0 although at the same time it is not
squarely consistent with the regulation of non-Indians present on
tribal uplands.0 ' The cases in which the Montana rule applied were
those in which tribal interests in land were taken away by Congress
and granted directly to non-Indians. 10 2 In contrast, tribes retain in-
terests in reservation waters for a variety of purposes. Nevertheless,
the two federal appellate court decisions considering tribal or state
regulatory power over water looked in part to the Montana test to
determine whether state permitting authority with regard to non-
member water use was preempted.'
Before non-Indians acquired land within reservations, there
was little doubt that federal and tribal law operated to the exclu-
sion of state law.0 4 That changed when the federal allotment policy
is the owner of the full equitable title to all of the waters of the Navajo Nation as defined in
§ 1104 of this subchapter, and that title resides undiminished in the Navajo Nation; the
United States holds the legal title to those waters solely as trustee for the Navajo Nation. B.
All rights to the use of the waters of the Navajo Nation are held subject to the overriding,
prior and supreme rights, interests and governmental authority of the Navajo Nation, and
the policy and provisions contained in this Code."); Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Reservation, Colville Tibal Law and Order Code, § 4-10-2(b), available at
http://www.colvilletribes.com/media/files/4-10.pdf ("All rights to the use of the waters of
the Colville Reservation are held by the Colville Tribes in perpetuity, for the use and bene-
fit of the Colville Tribes, its members, other persons as authorized herein, and the lands
and other resources of the Colville Reservation.").
100. See Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 810
(9th Cir. 2011) ("Montana limited the tribe's ability to exercise its power to exclude only as
applied to the regulation of non-Indians on non-Indian land, not on tribal land.").
101. In cases where the tribe has title to submerged lands, the analytic framework
would not employ the Montana line of cases, because the Montana presumption itself was
developed only after determining that Montana held title to the submerged land under
the Big Horn River. Montana, 450 U.S. at 550-56. Cf Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262
(2001) (holding that tribe has ownership of submerged lands at Lake Coeur d'Alene). For
a careful analysis of the submerged lands cases, see John P. LaVelle, Beatinga Path of Retreat
from Treaty Rights and Tribal Sovereignty: The Story of Montana v. United States, in INDIAN LAW
STORIES at 535, 558-69 (Goldberg, Washburn and Frickey eds., 2011).
102. SeeSolemn v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466-67 (1984) ("Congress passed a series of
surplus land acts at the turn of the century to force Indians onto individual allotments
carved out of reservations and to open up unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement.").
103. The question of whether states may regulate non-member activity on Indian
reservations is usually viewed as calling for a preemption analysis. See White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980). The Montana test applicable to tribal au-
thority over non-members is in many respects the flip side of the coin.
104. See supra note 1. When Congress did authorize state criminal and some civil ju-
risdiction over Indian country to select states in 1953, it explicitly disclaimed the grant of
any state authority over Indian treaty rights and water rights. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L.
No. 83-280, § 4(b), 67 Stat. 588, 18 U.S.C. § 11629(b) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1360(b)) ("Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxa-
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and consequent homesteading resulted in a substantial non-Indian
presence within Indian reservations. 0 5 As the non-Indian presence
on reservations increased throughout the late nineteenth and most
of the twentieth century, non-Indians and states simply assumed
the right to use reservation waters without federal or tribal approv-
al.'" The United States was often busy providing assistance to non-
Indian water users through the Bureau of Reclamation.' Moreo-
ver, few treaties make any mention of water resources at all,0" thus
precluding most arguments that the United States confirmed by
treaty tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian water use."'
The rules regarding tribal jurisdiction over non-tribal members
have evolved over time, but only two published Ninth Circuit deci-
sions have considered the scope of state jurisdiction over non-
Indian water use within reservations. In Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, the Ninth Circuit rejected state jurisdiction over non-
tion of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or
any Indian tribe, band, or community... ; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such
property .... ). Cf Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 411 (1968)
(holding that Public Law 280 did not grant states any jurisdiction over treaty hunting, fish-
ing and gathering rights).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19; see also United States v. McBratney, 104
U.S. 621 (1882) (holding that the state, not the federal government, had jurisdiction over
non-Indian v. non-Indian crime within Indian country).
106. See MCCOOL, su/ra note 41, at 26-29.
107. Anderson, snpra note 55, at 430-31; see Reed D. Benson, Federal Water Law and the
"Double Whammy ": How the Bureau of Reclamation Can Help the West Adapt to Drought and Cli-
mate Change, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1049, 1053-55 (2012) (summarizing history of the Bureau of
Reclamation).
108. See Treaty with the Nez Perces art. 8, June 9, 1863, 14 Stat. 647 ("The United
States also agree to reserve all springs or fountains not adjacent to, or directly connected
with, the streams or rivers within the lands hereby relinquished, and to keep back from
settlement or entry so much of the surrounding land as may be necessary to prevent the
said springs or fountains being enclosed; and, further, to preserve a perpetual right of way
to and from the same, as watering places, for the use in common of both whites and Indi-
ans."); Treaty with the Arapaho and Cheyenne, art. 2, Feb. 18, 1861, 112 Stat. 1163 ("Out
of the lands so set apart and retained there shall be assigned to each member of said
tribes, without distinction of age or sex, a tract of forty acres, to include in every case, as far
as practicable, a reasonable portion of timber and water"); Treaty with the Chippewa, art.
2, Dec. 20, 1837, 7 Stat. 547 ("The United States agree to reserve a location for said tribe
on the head waters of the Osage river, in the country visited by a delegation of the said
tribe during the present year, to be of proper extent, agreeably to their numbers, embrac-
ing a due proportion of wood and water, and lying contiguous to tribes of kindred lan-
guage."). No Indian treaties refer explicitly to tribal regulatory authority.
109. This is not surprising given that governmental power by tribes over reservations
wholly owned by a tribe carried with it the assumption that tribal law would control absent
some federal intervention. Cf Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (finding no federal
jurisdiction over murder of one tribal member by another absent explicit congressional
action assumingjurisdiction).
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Indian water use on the Colville Indian Reservation."' But in Unit-
ed States v. Anderson, the same circuit upheld state jurisdiction over
on-reservation water use of "excess waters" by non-Indians on non-
Indian land."' As explained more fully below, the state of Washing-
ton, after Anderson, now prefers not to exercise its regulatory au-
thority even with regard to off-reservation water users interfering
with Indian rights."12 In a third case, an unpublished Ninth Circuit
decision affirmed a lower court ruling that denied the Yakama Na-
tion's effort to regulate excess on-reservation water use by non-
Indians."3
The Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation brought
an action against Walton, a non-Indian who acquired land on the
Reservation from an Indian allotment owner. The Tribes (later
joined by the United States) alleged that Walton did not have the
right to use water from No Name Creek for irrigation purposes
and that state permits authorizing such uses were invalid."" While
the court concluded that Walton was entitled to use a portion of
the tribal reserved waters," 5 it also ruled that "when the Colville
reservation was created, sufficient appurtenant water was reserved
to permit irrigation of all practicably irrigable acreage on the res-
ervation.""' 6 The rights also extended to water for instream flows to
protect tribal fisheries in Omak Lake." 7 It was in this context that
110. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47-49 (9th Cir. 1981).
111. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984). Articles considering
tribal jurisdiction over water use in some detail include, Aaron H. Hostyk, Who Controls the
Water? The Emerging Balance among Federal, State and Indian jurisdictional Claims and Its Inpact
on Energy Development in the upper Colorado and Upper Missouri River Basins, 18 TULSA L. REv. 1
(1982); Judith V. Royster, Conjunctive Managemeunt of Reservation Water Resources: Legal Issues
Facing Indian Tribes, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 255 (2011); Steven J, Shupe, Water in Indian Country:
From Paper Rights to a Managed Resource, 57 COLO. L. REv. 561 (1986); Steven V. Quesenber-
ry, Timothy C. Seward & Adam P. Bailey, Tribal Strategies far Protecting and Preserving
Groundwater, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 431, 468-478 (2015).
112. See infra text accompanying note 141.
113. Holly v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 655 F.
Supp. 557, 557-58 (E.D. Wash. 1985) ("This memorandum serves only to memorialize the
court's oral ruling of July 11, 1985, that the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation (Yakima Nation), do not have inherent power to regulate or administer
non-Indian excess waters flowing through the Reservation."), affd sub nom, Holly v. Totus,
812 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1987).
114. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 44 (9th Cir. 1981).
115. Id. at 51 (holding that district court on remand must "determine the number of
irrigable acres Walton owns, and the amount of water he appropriated with reasonable
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the court next considered the validity of state water right permits
issued to Walton."' Noting that water rights are a unitary resource,
and that "regulation of water on a reservation is 'critical to the life-
style of its residents' and the "lifeblood of the community," the
court held that the reservation's creation preempted state regula-
tion.' The rationale for deference to state water law was inappli-
cable "[w]here land is set aside for an Indian reservation, [and]
Congress has [thus] reserved it for federal, as opposed to state
needs."' O2 The court added that "[b]ecause the No Name System is
located entirely within the reservation, state regulation of some
portion of its waters would create the jurisdictional confusion
Congress has sought to avoid."'' In addition, the court found it
important that the Walton property had been an Indian allotment,
and that the "only mention of water rights in the Allotment Act
suggest[ed] continued federal control."'2 2 The court noted that the
tribe had substantial interests in regulating reservation waters be-
cause "in arid and semi-arid regions of the West, water is the life-
blood of the community. " "' The case continued after remand, but
full quantification of the Tribes' reserved water rights for irrigation
and fisheries purposes has never been determined.'24 In addition,
the No Name Creek system was entirely within reservation bounda-
ries-an important distinction in the other Ninth Circuit decision
on the regulatory issue.
United States v. Anderson was brought by the United States to es-
118. Id.at51.
119. Id. at 52-53. The court also relied on United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650
(9th Cir. 1934), which involved a challenge to water use by a tribal member who had not
complied with state law. The challenge was denied on the grounds that "Montana statutes
regarding water rights are not applicable because Congress at no time has made such stat-
utes controlling in the reservation. In fact, the Montana enabling act specifically provided
that Indian lands, within the limits of the state, 'shall remain under the absolute jurisdic-
tion and control of the Congress of the United States."'
120. Walton, 647 F.2d at 53.
121. Id.
122. Id. The court noted that 25 U.S.C. § 381 provides that the Secretary of the Inte-
rior "is authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations" regarding water rights on res-
ervations with respect to allotted lands and priority dates for reacquired tribal lands. Cf.
Memorandum from John Leshy, Solicitor, Dep't of Interior, to Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the
Interior (March 30, 1995) (on file with author) ("Agricultural allottees have [water] rights
tribes cannot wholly defeat; at the same time tribes have regulatory authority over reserva-
tion water use from which allottees are not immune.").
123. Walton, 647 F.2d at 52.
124. Cf Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 752 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.1985) (resolv-
ing only claims involving Walton and Omak Lake).
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tablish tribal rights to the waters of Chamokane Creek, which orig-
inates north of the Spokane Indian Reservation. The Creek forms
the reservation's eastern boundary, and discharges into the Spo-
kane River, which in turn flows into the Columbia River at the res-
ervation's southwestern boundary. 25 Tribal rights to water for fish-
eries habitat and irrigation purposes were fully set forth in a
judgment entered in 1979 and partially amended in 1982.126 The
district court ruled that the state may issue permits to withdraw
"excess waters" on land owned by non-Indians inside the Reserva-
tion. 27 The district court reasoned that while state authority to is-
sue permits on the reservation to non-Indians might create "false
hopes" because all available water was awarded to the tribe for in-
stream and irrigation use, it could not harm federal or tribal inter-
ests, which were fully quantified and would be protected by a fed-
eral water master.2 s The full quantification of tribal waters and
appointment of a federal water master to protect tribal rights were
also central to the Ninth Circuit decision affirming the lower
court.
The facts in this case are readily distinguishable from the facts in
the Walton decision. By weighing the competing federal, tribal
and state interests involved, it is clear that the state may exercise
its regulatory jurisdiction over the use of surplus, non-reserved
Chamokane Basin waters by nonmembers on non-Indian fee
lands within the Spokane Indian Reservation. Central to our de-
cision is the fact that the interest of the state in exercising its ju-
risdiction will not infringe on the tribal right to self-government
nor impact on the Tribe's economic welfare because those rights
125. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1359 (9th Cir. 1984).
126. United States v. Anderson, No. 3643, Mem. Op. &J. at 2-3 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 12,
1979) (hereinafter Judgment). The early decisions appeared to assume that this was an
adjudication of all water rights in the Chamokane Creek Basin. SeeJudgment at 5, para. X.
The irrigation right was quantified at 25,380 acre feet of water to irrigate 8460 acres of
land, although the Judgment allows the irrigation right to be utilized for instream flow
purposes. Id. at 2, para. 11. The decision reported in United States v. Anderson, 591 F.
Supp. 1 (E.D. Wash. 1982) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984), is only
the decision on various motions to amend the Judgment, and cannot be understood with-
out reviewing the underlying, but unpublished, Judgment. The judge currently assigned to
this case recently stated his view that the case was not intended to be a general adjudica-
tion. Order Approving Water Master's 2014 Report; Ordering Parties to Meet and Confer
at 2, United States v. Anderson, No. CV 2:72-03643 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 8, 2015).
127. Judgment at 11, para. XXIII. While the regulatory issue was important, most of
the controversy dealt with the reservation of instream flows for fisheries habitat and the
quantity and priority dates for water to irrigate tribal lands.
128. Id.
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have been quantified and will be protected by the federal water master.
Additionally, in view of the hydrology and geography of the
Chamokane Creek Basin, the State of Washington's interest in
developing a comprehensive water program for the allocation of
surplus waters weighs heavily in favor of permitting it to extend
its regulatory authority to the excess waters, if any, of the
Chamokane Basin. State permits issued for any such excess water
will be subject to all preexisting rights and those preexisting
rights will be protected by the federal court decree and its ap-
pointed water master. We do not believe there is any realistic in-
fringement on tribal rights and protected affairs.129
In drawing the jurisdictional line, the court of appeals was
swayed by the "excess" nature of the waters. It now appears doubt-
ful that there are any "excess" waters.3 0 The court also noted that
all tribal rights in the Chamokane Creek Basin were subject to a
decree and would be protected by a federal water master. All of the
tribe's claims to water for irrigation and instream flows from the
Chamokane Creek Basin were adjudicated. The court also accept-
ed the State's argument that it was developing a comprehensive
management plan for the excess waters-a plan that apparently
never came to pass.
13 1
The Anderson litigation continues due in large part to adverse
effects to instream flow in Chamokane Creek from new groundwa-
ter wells exempt from the state permitting process. The parties had
assumed that certain groundwater uses could be excluded from
the adjudication because their water withdrawals did not affect
129. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1366 (emphasis added).
130. It is important to understand that the notion of "excess" implies a clear under-
standing of what is necessary or sufficient to satisfy tribal needs. As explained earlier, most
Indian tribes do not have a frill quantification of their water rights, so it is really quite im-
possible to know for certain whether there is water available for allocation to users who
might claim rights pursuant to state law-assuming state law is applied. See supra text ac-
companying notes 90-91; see also Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation v. Stults, 59 P.3d 1093, 1097 (Mont. 2002) (holding that the state "cannot issue
beneficial water use permits for groundwater [or surface water] until the Tribes' federally
reserved water rights have been defined and quantified").
131. In its infringement analysis, the Ninth Circuit found that unlike Walton, state
jurisdiction on the Spokane Reservation would lead to no 'jurisdictional confusion." An-
derson, 736 F.2d at 1366 (West 2003). However, the case remains in litigation at least partly
because groundwater pumping pursuant to state law is not subject to any advance permit-
ting requirements, which would require a determination that unappropriated water is
available. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 90.44.050 (2003) (exempting certain groundwater
wells from the permitting process); Five Corners Family Farmers v. State, 268 P.3d 892, 895
(Wash. 2011) ("withdrawals of groundwater for stock-watering purposes [under exempt-
well statute] are not limited to any particular quantity.").
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streamflow in the Creek. All parties and the court thought the up-
per basin groundwater lacked a hydrologic connection to the sur-
face water in the Creek, but a commissioned United States Geolog-
ical Survey study revealed a connection. 32 Now all parties agree
that the 1982 Order must be amended to reflect the interconnect-
edness of Upper, Middle and Lower Basins of the Creek, and the
Tribe and State agree that certain non-parties to the earlier Judg-
ment must now be regulated. 3' In an interesting twist, the State of
Washington (which clearly has jurisdiction over off-reservation
groundwater use) now takes the position that it should not be
forced to regulate the off-reservation groundwater use by non-
parties to the litigation."' There is no dispute that under state law,
the off-reservation groundwater pumpers are junior to the tribe's
right. But because they are exempt from the State's permitting re-
quirements, it is difficult to ascertain their relative priorities as a
matter of state law. 135 After fighting hard to achieve authority to
regulate non-Indian water use on non-Indian fee land on the Spo-
kane Reservation, the State of Washington now prefers to defer to
the federal court to regulate off-reservation state groundwater us-
ers. 1 6 For its part, the United States continues to object to expand-
ing the case and takes the position that "Ecology can now begin to
regulate Upper Basin water uses as appropriate so that those uses
do not impair the Tribe's senior adjudicated rights."'37 The Spo-
kane Tribe wants the federal court and its appointed master to
regulate all state water use in the basin-including the post-decree
132. Order re: Hearing on the Annual Report of the Water Master at 2, No. CV 2:72-
03643 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 5, 2014).
133. Id at 3-4.
134. Ecology's Briefing in Response to Court Order at 1-2, United States v. Ander-
son, No. CV 2:72-03643 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014) ("Ecology asks the Court to expand the
orders in this case, ensure notice and due process in determining quantity and priority of
users, and bring them under regulation of the [federal] water master.").
135. Order, supra note 132, at 3-4. As currently situated, the parties rely on a federal
court appointed water master to ensure compliance with the court's decree. Regulating a
large number of exempt well owners and pre-water code right claimants (those who claim
water use before the state's permitting system was adopted in 1917) will be a huge task. See
Response Brief of the United States to the Opening Briefs of the Washington Dept. of
Ecology and Spokane Tribe Responding to the Factual and Legal Questions in the August
11, 2006 Order at 3, 13-14, United States v. Anderson, No. CV 2:72-03643 (E.D. Wash. May
10, 2013).
136. Ecology Brief, supra note 134, at 1-2.
137. United States' Response to Briefs of Washington Department of Ecology and
Spokane Tribe filed on December 15, 2014 at 2, United States v. Anderson, No. CV 2:72-
03643 (E.D. Wash.Jan. 15, 2015).
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groundwater use. 3 ' The Tribe's argument that this is in effect a
federal court general stream adjudication is quite convincing, alt-
hough there is some ambiguity in the record. In its most recent
Order, the court stated that the case was not a general stream ad-
judication.'" The court views the "purpose of the proceeding to be
the protection of the water rights of the Spokane Tribe of Indians
and to give the water master clear and sufficient regulatory powers
to protect those rights.'
' 40
The. point here is not to suggest a resolution of the complex
dispute, but to illustrate the complexity of water regulation, and
some real-world reluctance to engage in regulation.'' This may be
part of the reason why there are not more reported decisions on
the regulatory issue. Indian tribes and states have for the past forty
years been embroiled in litigation over water quantity in both fed-
eral and state courts. It appears that once the litigation is conclud-
ed by a judgment or settlement, the parties are generally content
to simply allow the decree to do the regulating as parties use their
quantified rights.14 In such cases, the court that issued the decree
138. See Spokane Tribe of Indians' Supplemental Brief Re: Order of November 5,
2014 at 16, United States v. Anderson, No. CV 2:72-03643 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2015).
139. Order Approving Water Master's 2014 Report Ordering Parties to Meet and
Confer at 2, United States v. Anderson, No. CV 2:72-03643 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 8, 2015).
140. Id. If there are no other users with rights senior to the tribe, which is a virtual
certainty, the question will be how and who will regulate the junior rights holders who may
be adversely affecting senior tribal instream flows. The court's Order does not address that
issue, but contains the cryptic comments that it "does not have to determine the relative
seniority of other junior water users. This is something the state can do if it chooses." Id.
One approach would be for the junior users to be joined as parties to the case and en-
joined from interfering with the senior tribal rights.
141. See supra note 40 and authorities cited therein. The state of Washington is un-
doubtedly concerned about the expense and political ramifications of limiting groundwa-
ter pumpers to protect tribal instream flows. In addition, it may have some legal worries
about its authority. The Washington Department of Ecology is precluded from deciding
disputes between state right holders outside of a general stream adjudication. Rettkowski v.
Dep't of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 238 (Wash. 1993). Whether this would also apply to limita-
tions resulting from a federal court decree may be doubted, but the answer is not certain.
Cf Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n., 443 U.S. 658,
695 (1979) ("State-law prohibition against compliance with the District Court's decree
cannot survive the command of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion."), modified sub nom., Washington v. United States, 444 U.S. 816 (1979).
142. In Wyoming's Big Horn River Adjudication, the court asserted authority to deny
a tribal change in use of.a quantified water right. In re General Adjudication of All Rights
to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 835 P.2d 273, 275 (Wyo. 1992). The court's ra-
tionale is unclear, and the ruling seems inconsistent with the notion that the McCarran
Amendment does not grant regulatory jurisdiction to the states. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK
OFFEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, §§ 19.03[6], 19.04[2].
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can resolve any disputes regarding use of waters subject to it. The
next Part discusses two important federal angles: 1) the Depart-
ment of the Interior's forty-year moratorium on approving tribal
water codes; and 2) the EPA's consistent recognition of inherent
tribal authority to regulate water quality of all reservation waters.
V. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TO
STRENGTHEN TRIBAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE WATER IN INDIAN
COUNTRY
A. The Department of the Interior's Moratorium on the Approval of Tribal
Water Codes Is an Impediment to Tribal Management that Should be
Removed.
A separate problem that some tribes experience is the fact that
they may be literally "late to the party" in terms of regulating non-
member water use on their reservations. Until the advent of the
self-determination movement of the 1970s, tribes were battling
termination and assimilation efforts, with only a brief respite dur-
ing the New Deal years. 4 ' In the interim, states developed their
regulatory systems and asserted rights to use and regulate non-
Indian use on reservations. In the early 1970s tribes asserted their
regulatory powers in the water context, but many confronted a
"temporary moratorium" on the approval of tribal water .regula-
tions, which was imposed by Secretary of the Interior Rogers B.
Morton in 1975.' This means that any tribe that needs secretarial
143. Id. §§ 1.04-1.07.
144. Memorandum from Rogers C.B. Morton, Sec'y of the Interior to the Comm'r of
Indian Affairs (Jan. 15, 1975) ("Our authority to regulate the use of water on Indian reser-
vations is presently in litigation. I am informed, however, that some tribes may be consider-
ing the enactment of water use codes of their own. This could lead to confusion and a se-
ries of separate legal challenges that might lead to undesirable results. I ask, therefore,
that you instruct all agency superintendents and area directors to disapprove any tribal
ordinance, resolution, code, or other enactment which purports to regulate the use of wa-
ter on Indian reservations and which by the terms of the tribal governing document is sub-
ject to such approval or review in order to become or to remain effective, pending ulti-
mate determination of this matter."). See Steven J. Shupe, Water in Indian Country: From
Paper Rights to a Managed Resource, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 561, 579-81 (1986) (discussing mor-
atorium). The litigation referred to involved the Colville Indian Reservation and the Unit-
ed States, with the latter's ultimately successful position that the state of Washington
lacked jurisdiction to issue permits for water use on the Colville Indian Reservation. Letter
from Kent Frizell, Asst. Att'y Gen. Land and Natural Res. Div., to U.S. Att'y Gen., Spokane,
WA (March 6, 1973). The moratorium does not extend to tribal regulations governing wa-
ter quality. Memorandum from Roy Sampsel, Deputy Asst. Sec'y Indian Affairs, re: BIA
Policy on Concurrence with Tribal Water Quality Codes (Aug. 2, 1982) (on file with law
review).
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approval of a code, including most tribes organized under the In-
dian Reorganization Act, cannot get a water code approved.1
45
Rules for code approval have been proposed but never consum-
mated, and other informal efforts have similarly failed. 46 For the
tribes required to obtain secretarial approval before implementing
a tribal water code, there are a few options. First, the Secretary
could simply lift the moratorium and thus act upon any pending
or future tribal requests. Second, Congress could mandate approv-
al of codes unless inconsistent with "applicable laws," as it did
when the Secretary failed to timely act upon requests for tribal
constitutional revisions.'47 Such "applicable laws" in the tribal con-
stitution context are defined as "any treaty, Executive order or Act
of Congress or any final decision of the Federal courts which are
applicable to the tribe, and any other laws which are applicable to
the tribe pursuant to an Act of Congress or by any final decision of
the Federal courts." 4 ' A third approach would be to sue the Secre-
tary under the Administrative Procedure Act under section 706 if
the Secretary adhered to the moratorium after a tribal request to
approve a proposed tribal code.'49 Because the moratorium was put
in place as a temporary measure, it would seem arbitrary and ca-
pricious to adhere to a "temporary" policy issued nearly forty years
ago as part of a litigation strategy. 51 Of course, the Secretary of the
Interior could voluntarily act upon a tribal proposal in the spirit of
her trust responsibility to support tribal sovereignty and control of
145. Over 250 Indian tribes are organized under the Indian Reorganization Act.
25 U.S.C. § 476 (2014). COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, at 257
n.16, 353 n.548.
146. See Proposed Rule: Regulation of Reserved Waters on Indian Reservations, 46
Fed. Reg. 944 (proposed Jan. 5, 1981); Indian Reservations: Use of Water, 42 Fed. Reg.
14885 (proposed Mar. 17, 1977) The proposed rules would have only permitted tribal
regulation of the use of quantified reserved water rights, or the estimated amount of re-
served waters. The preamble also explained that state water rights would be unaffected by
any code. Neither proposal spoke to the allocation of reservation waters beyond what was
either quantified as reserved, or estimated to be reserved. Both proposals provided for
non-member use of tribal reserved waters by tribal permit.
147. 25 U.S.C. § 4 7 6 (c) (2004).
148. Act of Nov. 1, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-581, § 102(1), 102 Stat. 2938 (1988).
149. There is no record of any challenge to the moratorium by way of litigation.
150. Although courts show deference to certain agency actions, agencies are under
an obligation to at least respond to requests for action on tribal ordinance approval. Cf
Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) ("[A] claim under § 706(1)
can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency ac-
tion that it is required to take.").
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natural resources. 151
In any event, the water code moratorium stands as an obstacle
to the exercise of the self-determination by at least some tribes.
The best solution is for the Secretary to lift it, so that tribes wishing
to assert regulatory authority may do so. This would be consistent
with EPA's determination that forty-nine tribes have inherent au-
thority to regulate water use on non-tribal lands within reserva-
tions, and its consequent approval of tribal water quality standards
under the CWA.
B. The Clean Water Act's Treatment as a State Provision
This section explains how the EPA administers the Clean Water
Act's provisions allowing tribes to obtain treatment as a state (TAS)
and thus regulate all reservation waters, and anyone who might
pollute those waters, regardless of tribal membership: While the
program is a success, more tribes would likely assume TAS status if
the EPA follows through on a new proposal to no longer require
that tribes demonstrate inherent authority over non-member fee
land under the Montana line of cases. This would allow more tribes
to unify regulation of water quality and other water management
responsibilities on their reservations. Of course, comprehensive
management requires a good deal of personnel and effort (and
thus expense), so that a cooperative model might be desirable un-
der some circumstances.
1. Current administration of the CWA requires a Montana analysis
for each tribe applicant
There are many environmental laws of nationwide application,
and most of these laws include tribes, along with states, as eligible
to administer the regulatory programs within their respective ju-
risdiction.152 Because states generally lack regulatory authority with-
in Indian country, EPA sometimes directly enforces federal envi-
ronmental laws within Indian country.'53 EPA may also preclude
151. Judith V. Royster, Indian Water and the Federal Tr7ust: Some Proposals for Federal Ac-
tion, 46 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 375, 383-84 (2006) (urging the Department to lift the morato-
rium and noting that several congressionally approved Indian water settlements have pro-
visions approving or contemplating tribal water codes).
152. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK Or FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, at 788-
91; Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Examining Tribal Environmental Law, 39 COLUM.J. ENVTL.
L. 42 (2014).
153. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA, 803 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1986) (affirming
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the exercise of state jurisdiction absent an express delegation to
the states under applicable statutes.154 EPA's 1984 Indian policy,
the first announced by any federal agency, was re-affirmed in 2014
by EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy: "The EPA works with tribes
on a government-to-government basis to protect the land, air and
water in Indian Country. 1 55 This is especially true with respect to
water quality.
Congress passed the CWA to "restore and maintain the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters
through the elimination of pollutant discharge into those wa-
ters."' 6 Section 301 (a) of the CWA provides for effluent limitation
guidelines, which are technology-based standards designed to re-
strict the quantities, rates and concentrations of specified sub-
stances discharged from point sources. 1 7 The other means to pro-
tect water quality is through water quality standards authorized in
section 303(c). 51 Unlike the technology-based effluent limitations
guidelines, water quality standards are not based on pollution con-
trol technologies, but express the desired condition or use of a
particular waterway. Water quality standards supplement technolo-
gy-based effluent limitations guidelines "so that numerous point
sources, despite individual compliance with effluent limitations,
may be further regulated to prevent water quality from falling be-
low acceptable levels."'' 51 Water quality standards may be expressed
as: (1) one or more designated "uses" of each waterway (e.g., public
water supply, recreation, or agriculture) consistent with the goals
of the Act; (2) "criteria" expressed in numerical concentration lev-
els or narrative statements specifying the amount of various pollu-
tants that may be present in the water and still protect the desig-
EPA's authority under the Safe Drinking Water Act to regulate oil and gas development to
protect groundwater sources in the absence of a provision authorizing tribal administra-
tion of the statute).
154. Wash. Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985) (denying state
jurisdiction to regulate Indians and non-Indians within Indian Country under Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act because Congress had not authorized state regulation).
155. Memorandum from Gina McCarthy to All EPA Employees (Jan. 9, 2014), avail-
able al http://www.epa.gov/indian/basicinfo/1984-indian-policy-reaffirmation-memo-
09JAN14.pdf. SeeJames M. Grijalva, The Ofig ns of EPA's Indian Program, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB
POL'Y 191 (2006).
156. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 422 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a)).
157. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2014).
158. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2014).
159. Browner, 97 F.3d at 419 n.4.
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nated uses; and (3) an anti-degradation provision.60
The Act gives states 6 ' and tribes6 2 the authority to establish wa-
ter quality standards for waters within state and tribal boundaries,
to certify compliance with those standards and to issue and enforce
discharge permits under the supervision of the EPA.'13 State juris-
diction does not, however, extend into Indian country, so tribes
are the primary authority for enforcing the law on Indian reserva-
tions."'4 Similarly, tribes do not have direct regulatory jurisdiction
over off-reservation activities. When certified for treatment as a
state under the CWA, a tribe may set tribal water quality standards
that may be enforced off the reservation against non-tribal water
polluters, but such enforcement is carried out by the EPA.'60
Section 518 of the CWA allows tribes to administer most of the
provisions of the Act. In pertinent part it provides:
The Administrator is authorized to treat an Indian tribe as a State
S. . to the degree necessary to carry out the objectives of this sec-
tion, but only if-
(1) the Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial
governmental duties and powers; (2) the functions to be exer-
cised by the Indian tribe pertain to the management and protec-
tion of water resources which are held by an Indian tribe, held by
160. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2) (A) (1995)); 40 C.F.R. § 131 (2015).
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (West 2014), d&.cussed in Wisconsin v. E.P.A., 266 F.3d 741, 743-
44 (7th Cir. 2001).
162. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (West 2014).
163. Id.
164. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA POLICY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS (1984), available at
http://www.epa.gov/indian/pdf/indian-policy-84.pdf. "EPA recognizes Tribal Govern-
ments as sovereign entities with primary authority and responsibility for the reservation
populace. Accordingly, EPA will work directly with Tribal Governments as the independ-
ent authority for reservation affairs, and not as political subdivisions of States or other
governmental units." Id. See Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis. v. Vill. of Hobart, Wis., 732
F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2013) ("But the uniform understanding has been that states and
their subdivisions are not authorized to regulate stormwater or other pollution on Indian
lands, including Indian trust lands. Those lands are not exempt from the Clean Water Act.
But it is the Indian governments of those lands ... rather than states, that can be delegat-
ed regulatory authority under the Act.") (citation omitted).
165. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 423-24 (10th Cir. 1996) ("The ex-
press incorporation in § 1377(e) of §§ 1341 and 1342 gives the EPA the authority to issue
NPDES permits in compliance with a tribe's water quality standards."). The converse is al-
so true if a downstream state has more stringent standards than an upstream tribe. Id. at
424 ("Section 1341 authorizes states to establish NPDES programs with the EPA, and §
1342 authorizes the EPA to issue NPDES permits in compliance with downstream state's
water quality standards.").
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the United States in trust for Indians, held by a member of an
Indian tribe if such property interest is subject to a trust re-
striction on alienation, or otherwise within the borders of an In-
dian reservation; and (3) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected
to be capable, in the Administrator's judgment, of carrying out
the functions to be exercised in a manner consistent with the
terms and purposes of this chapter and of all applicable regula-
tions. '66
The EPA interpreted this provision of the statute not as a direct
federal delegation of authority to implement the CWA within res-
ervations, but as a limited delegation of authority, operating only
to the extent that a tribe could demonstrate inherent authority
over all lands and water within reservation boundaries. The im-
plementing regulations provide that, in order for a tribe to admin-
ister a water quality standards program, it must 1) demonstrate
that it is recognized by the Secretary of the Interior; 2) demon-
strate that it has a governing body currently carrying out substan-
tial governmental duties and powers over a defined area; 3)
demonstrate that it has legal authority to regulate water quality on
its entire reservation, regardless of land ownership; and 4) provide
a narrative statement describing its capability of administering an
effective water quality standards program.'6 7 The third require-
ment-that the applicant tribe demonstrate its "inherent" authori-
ty over all waters within the reservation-requires that the appli-
cant tribe pass muster under the Montana line of cases. EPA's
response to public comments to the proposed rulemaking explains
the context for EPA's evaluation of tribal inherent authority:
a tribal submission meeting the requirements of § 131.8 of this
regulation will need to make a relatively simple showing of facts
that there are waters within the reservation used by the Tribe or
tribal members, (and thus that the Tribe or tribal members could
be subject to exposure to pollutants present in, or introduced in-
to, those waters) and that the waters, and critical habitat are sub-
ject to protection under the Clean Water Act. The Tribe must al-
so explicitly assert that impairment of such waters by the activities
of non-Indians, would have a serious and substantial effect on the
health and welfare of the Tribe. Once the Tribe meets this initial
burden, EPA will, in light of the facts presented by the tribe and
the generalized statutory and factual findings regarding the im-
166. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (West 2014).
167. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8.
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portance of reservation water quality discussed above, presume
that there has been an adequate showing of tribal jurisdiction of
fee lands, unless an appropriate governmental entity (e.g., an ad-
jacent Tribe or State) demonstrates a lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the Tribe.""
This inherent authority element of the regulation is the provi-
sion that has drawn the most interest, and the most criticism, over
the years.'69 It requires a tribe to satisfy the "direct effects" excep-
168. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to Stand-
ards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,878-79 (Dec. 12, 1991) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131). EPA also noted that "because of the mobile nature of pollutants in
surface waters and the relatively small length/size of stream segments or other water bod-
ies on reservations, it would be practically very difficult to separate out the effects of water
quality impairment on non-Indian fee land within a reservation with those on tribal por-
tions. In other words, any impairment that occurs on, or as a result of, activities on non-
Indian fee lands are very likely to impair the water and critical habitat quality of the tribal
lands. This also suggests that the serious and substantial effects of water quality impair-
ment within the non-Indian portions of a reservation are very likely to affect the tribal in-
terest in water quality." Id. at 64,878. EPA provides guidance on the sort of information
needed to satisfy a tribe's burden to demonstrate inherent authority over nonmembers on
its reservation. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ATTACHMENT C (2013), available
at http://www.epa.gov/tp/pdf/tas-strategy-attach-c.pdf.
169. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Chevron Doctrine in Federal Indian Law and the
Agencies' Duty to Internet Legislation in Favor of Indians: Did the EPJA Reconcile the Two in Inter-
preting the "Tribes as States " Section of the Clean Water Act, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 15 (1998)
(arguing that Chevron deference applies; that the Indian canons apply to the agency inter-
pretation; that EPA unlawfully failed to apply the canons; that if the canons were applied
EPA should have found congressional confirmation of inherent tribal authority over all
water use on reservations; or that EPA could have interpreted the ambiguity in favor of a
delegation of federal authority). See also Marren Sanders, Clean Water in hdian Country:
The Risks (and Rewards) of Being Treated in the Same Manner as a State, 36 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 533, 54041 (2010) ("Joining the debate, scholars cannot seem to agree as to the
source of tribal authority to set and enforce WQSs. While some argue that the TAS provi-
sion recognizes inherent tribal sovereignty over all waters within reservation boundaries,
others contend that the CWA delegated federal authority to tribes to exercise this power.
Still others conclude that the CWA both devolves jurisdiction and is a delegation of power
to tribes to regulate WQSs." (internal citations omitted)); Ann E. Tweedy, Using Plenary
Power as a Sword: Tribal Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act After United
States v. Lara, 35 ENvrL. L. 471, 486 (2005) ("[Slection 518(e) should be read to recog-
nize and affirm tribal sovereignty.");Jessica Owley, Tribal Sovereignty aver Water Quality, 20J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 61, 62-63 (2004) (arguing that section 518 should be read as ac-
knowledging tribal authority over waters and as delegating federal enforcement authority
to the tribes); Regina Cutler, To Clear the Muddy Waters: Tribal Regulatary Authority Under Sec-
tion 518 of the Clean Water Act, 29 ENvTL. L. 721, 738 (1999) (arguing that a court could
conclude that "section 518 [of the CWA] and its legislative history are not ambiguous and
that the section does in fact constitute a direct delegation of CWA regulatory authority to
qualified tribes.") Further, in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, a plurality opinion cited the CWA as an example of express federal delegation. 492
U.S. at 428 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) & (h)(1)).
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tion in Montana, 70 which has been said to apply only when the
non-member activity "imperil[s] the subsistence of the tribal
community.'' 7. Polluting tribal water certainly could imperil tribal
subsistence, and the EPA has found that tribal applicants have met
this standard forty-nine times, making them eligible to promulgate
water quality standards.'72 The appellate decisions upholding EPA's
actions are discussed next.
In Browner,173 the challenge was not premised on the question
of tribal authority on the reservation, but on the question of
whether tribes could adopt more stringent water quality standards
enforceable by the EPA on off-reservation parties discharging from
a point source. The question was answered in the affirmative. In
Montana v. EPA, 74 the Ninth Circuit upheld the EPA's approval of
the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Res-
ervation's application for treatment as a state. The court carefully
analyzed and distinguished intervening Supreme Court precedent
in confirming tribal authority over nonmembers.'75 Particularly
significant to the court was the fact that water has such great im-
portance to tribes, and that non-member pollution of reservation
waters could have a substantial effect on the health and welfare of
170. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
171. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 341
(2008) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)).
172. EPA's website lists the forty-nine tribes that have been found eligible to promul-
gate water quality standards, and the forty-one with approved water quality standards. indi-
an Tribal Approvals, Water: State, Tribal & Territorial Standards, UNITED STATES ENVIL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/wqslibrary/
approvtable.cfm (last visited May 15, 2015); Tribal Water Quality Standards alnoved ty EPA,
Water: State, Tribal & Territorial Standards, UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/wqslibrary/tribes.cfm (last visited
May 15, 2015). There do not appear to be any decisions rejecting a tribal application for
TAS for failure to satisfy the Montana inherent authority test. It is interesting to note that
the Spokane Tribe obtained TAS status despite the Anderson court's ruling that the state
could regulate "excess water" use by non-Indians on the reservation. Decision Document:
Approval of the Spokane Tribe of the Spokane Reservation Application for Treatment in
the Same Manner as a State for Sections 303(c) and 401 of the Clean Water Act at 11-15
(Apr. 22, 2003) (on file with author). See ivfia note 174, for information on the Confeder-
ated Colville Tribes' status under the CWA.
173. SeeCity of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 421-23 (10th Cir. 1996).
174. Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998).
175. The court distinguished Strafe v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), on the
ground that the tribe in that case had completely surrendered its interests in the highway
it sought to regulate, and reserved no right to exercise control over the federal right-of-way
maintained by the state. Id. ("The conduct of users of a small stretch of highway has no
potential to affect the health and welfare of a tribe in any way approaching the threat in-
herent in impairment of the quality of the principal water source.").
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the tribe and its members.'76 In Wisconsin v. EPA, 77 which involved
the Mole Lake Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, the Seventh Cir-
cuit similarly agreed with the EPA's conclusion that non-member
pollution would have a direct effect on the health, safety, and wel-
fare of the tribe sufficient to bring it within the scope of tribal ju-
risdiction under Montana's second exception.'78 Wisconsin argued
that its presumed ownership of submerged lands precluded tribal
jurisdiction. The court rejected that claim."' Still, the Supreme
Court could limit tribal eligibility to administer the program if it
rejected the EPA's presumptive mode of analyzing tribal inherent
authority; and, the time and expense involved in the TAS process
has prompted the EPA to reconsider its position.
1
2. EPA 's proposal to reinterpret the CWA as a delegation offederal
authority to tribes.
EPA announced last year that it is considering a reinterpreta-
tion of the Clean Water Act's relevant provision to obviate the
need for a finding of inherent tribal jurisdiction under the Mon-
tana line of cases to qualify for Treatment as a State. 8 ' In April of
176. See 1I. at 1141 (citing Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52
(1981)) ("Colville also supports EPA's generalized finding that due to the mobile nature of
pollutants in surface water it would in practice be very difficult to separate the effects of
water quality impairment on non-Indian fee land from impairment on the tribal portions
of the reservation: 'A water system is a unitary resource. The actions of one user have an
immediate and direct effect on other users."'). Interestingly, the Colville Confederated
Tribes are the only tribe to have successfully litigated their inherent authority over non-
member water use outside of the CWA. The water quality standards that operate on the
reservation were promulgated by the EPA and the tribe is not now certified under the TAS
provision. See Water Quality Standards for the Colville Indian Restvation in the State of Washing-
ton, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,625 (July 6, 1989). EPA explained that this "promulgation action is
tnique because: (1) It was initiated before the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act
were enacted, and (2) it is based on water quality standards previously developed by the
Colville Confederated Tribes for application to waters on their reservation." Id.
177. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001).
178. Id. at 750 ("Because the Band has demonstrated that its water resources are es-
sential to its survival, it was reasonable for the EPA, ... to allow the tribe to regulate water
quality on the reservation, even though that power entails some authority over off-
reservation activities.").
179. Id. at 747 ("Because the state does not contend that its ownership of the beds
would preclude the federal government from regulating the waters within the reservation,
it cannot now complain about the federal government allowing tribes to do so. It was rea-
sonable for the EPA to determine that ownership of the waterbeds did not preclude feder-
ally approved regulation of the quality of the water, and we uphold that determination.").
180. See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Under Consideration: Potential Re-
interpretation of a Clean Water Act Provision Regarding Tribal Eligibility to Administer
Regulatory Programs (2014), available at
WA TER RIGHTS IN INDIAN COUNTRY
2014, EPA sent out a consultation letter to tribal leaders in antici-
pation of a.rulemaking process for a major change in the admin-
istration of the CWA's application to Indian tribes.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is ini-
tiating consultation and coordination with federally-recognized
Indian tribes concerning a potential reinterpretation of Clean
Water Act provisions regarding treatment of tribes in the same
manner as a state (TAS). The reinterpretation could reduce
some of the time and effort for tribes submitting applications for
TAS for regulatory programs under the Clean Water Act. Specifi-
cally, EPA is considering reinterpreting section 518(e) as a dele-
gation by Congress of authority to eligible tribes to administer
Clean Water Act regulatory programs over their entire reserva-
tions. This reinterpretation would replace EPA's current inter-
pretation that applicant tribes need to demonstrate their inher-
ent regulatory authority. All other tribal eligibility requirements
established in the Act and EPA's regulations would remain in
place. l s
The idea of revising EPA's approach is a good one. The re-
quirement that tribes demonstrate inherent tribal authority is a
significant hurdle, although it is aided by EPA's presumption that
tribes have such authority due to the significant effects of water
pollution on tribal communities on reservations. 2 The Lummi Na-
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/wqslibrary/tribal.cfm.
181. Letter from Elizabeth Southerland, Director, Office of Science and Technology,
U. S. Evntl. Prot. Agency, to Tribal Leaders (April 18, 2014) (on file with author). See Under
Consideration: Potential Reinterpretation of a Clean Water Act Provision Regarding Tribal Eligibility
to Administer Regulatory Programs, U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, available, at
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/wqslibrary/tribal.cfm (last visited
May 15, 2015). In response to a Freedom of Information Act request, the EPA provided
letters from over twenty Indian tribes and tribal organizations supporting the reinterpreta-
tion. The gist of most of the letters was that the interpretation better mapped the plain
language that authorized TAS status for tribes over land "otherwise within the borders of
an Indian reservation." See, e.g., Letter from Silas C. Whitman, Nez Perce Tribal Executive
Committee Chairman to Fred Leutner, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (July 7, 2014) (on file with
author). In addition, the majority of the tribes commented negatively on the expense and
administrative burden of demonstrating that the Montana analysis supported their applica-
tion. Two tribes asked for more consultation, and several states asked for more infor-
mation and expressed concerns about the proposal. See, e.g., Letter from Cathy Stepp,
Sec'y, Wisconsin Dept. of Nat. Res., to Dr. Susan Hedman, U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Sept.
12, 2014) (on file with author).
182. Professor Tweedy points out that the process to demonstrate inherent authority
is lengthy and requires significant resource investments that many tribes may not be able
to make up front. In addition, undertaking the Montana analysis is complex and difficult
given the Supreme Court's record in such cases. Ann E. Tweedy, supra note 169, at 479-80.
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tion submitted an application in 1995, but it was not approved by
the EPA until 2007.113 The Swinomish Tribe went through a more
expedited process that commenced in 2006 and concluded suc-
cessfully in 2008.84 The EPA recognizes that a significant part of
the effort focuses on the inherent-tribal-authority prong of the
current certification process, which may deter some tribes from
applying. 18' The EPA's reinterpretation would consider section 518
of the CWA as a direct delegation of federal authority to tribes to
regulate all land on a reservation regardless of its status as trust or
non-trust land, and regardless of the non-member status of the
regulated party.
Experience demonstrates that the application process is quite
complicated and lengthy, and the EPA's judgment that a reinter-
pretation would more fully comport with congressional intent fa-
voring tribal administration should be given some deference.18" It is
possible that many more tribes could use CWA authority if not re-
quired to undertake the complicated and expensive analysis re-
quired by the Montana line of cases. It would also eliminate the
possibility that a Supreme Court decision adverse to the EPA on
183. The Lummi decision reflects considerable back and forth between the agency
and the tribe due in part to litigation over groundwater rights on the reservation. Decision
Document: Approval of the Lummi Nation Application for Treatment in the Same Man-
ner as a State for Sections 303(c) and 401 of the Clean Water Act, U. S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY (March 5, 2007) (on file with author).
184. Even so, the Swinomish decision reveals three separate submissions from tribal
counsel with a total of ninety-two attachments. See Decision Document: Approval of the
Swinomish Indian Tribal Community's Application for Treatment in the Same Manner as
a State for Sections 303(c) and 401 of the Clean Water Act, U. S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY
(April 8, 2008) (one file with author).
185. In its annual report addressing environmental justice, EPA's Office of General
Counsel explained its view of the problem.
Under EPA's current approach, some tribes may defer seeking TAS for CWA
programs because of this inherent authority element. To demonstrate inher-
ent authority, tribes sometimes need to present detailed factual showings relat-
ing to impacts of the regulated activities on the applicant tribe, including
non-member activities on reservation land. Tribes have expressed concern
over making these demonstrations, which are functioning for some tribes as a
deterrent to seeking TAS status. As EPA recognized in the preamble to its
final TAS regulations for the water quality standards (WQS) program, the
CWA might be amenable to a different interpretation.
United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, Plan EJ 2014 Legal Tools, at 79 (2014), available at
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/wqslibrary/upload/ej-egal-
tools.pdf.
186. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 4, at 796-97.
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the inherent jurisdiction question could severely undermine the
program. In addition, most commentators disagree with the EPA's
interpretation that the Act requires a demonstration of inherent
tribal authority. I"7 The D.C. Circuit, in a case involving the Clean
Air Act, expressed similar doubt in the context of comparing the
CWA's delegation provision to the delegation provision found in
the Clean Air Act. "One federal court has observed, in dicta, that
'the statutory language [in the Clean Water Act] seems to indicate
plainly that Congress did intend to delegate . . authority to
tribes.""'88
Most importantly, the EPA's preliminary proposal has strong
textual support. Absent from the statutory text is any reference to
the scope of an Indian tribe's inherent authority. As always, the
words of the statute provide the best initial guide to its meaning.
Congress set out three statutory criteria to determine where to
recognize a tribal applicant as eligible to administer applicable
provisions of the CWA. Section 518 provides for tribal treatment of
a state if: 1) the tribe has a functioning governing body capable of
administering substantial duties and powers; 2) the functions to be
exercised relate to trust property, or property "otherwise within
the borders of an Indian reservation; and 3) the EPA believes the
tribe is "reasonably expected to be capable" of carrying out the
functions prescribed by the relevant statutes."' The delineation be-
tween land held in trust, i.e., tribal or individually allotted lands,
and land "otherwise within the boundaries of the reservation" in-
dicates that if the tribal functions relate to such lands, the tribal
application may be treated as a state under section 518. As noted
above, the plain meaning approach also has the benefit of elimi-
nating a burdensome criterion from the application process, sav-
ing precious time that the staffs of both EPA and applicant tribes
187. See supra note 169.
188. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280, 1291-92 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal
citation omitted).
189. See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (West 2014). This plain meaning approach fits neatly
with the notion that statutory interpretation should ensure that the clear terms of a statute
are enforced. SeeJohn F. Manning, Second-Generalion Texiualim, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1317
(2010). From the outset EPA has acknowledged that the legislative history is ambiguous, so
there is no argument that EPA's proposal would be contrary to any solid legislative history.
See Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulations that Pertain to Standards on
Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,880 (1991). See also Skibine, supra note 169
("The main problem with EPA's interpretation is that nothing in the words of the statute
mandates a finding of tribal jurisdiction over water resources before a tribe can be treated
as a state under the CWA.").
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must otherwise spend on the process. At the end of the day, the
tribes end up in the same position they are in under the current
regime: approved tribes have the authority to set water quality
standards and issue NPDES (pollution discharge) permits on their
reservations.' 0 Similarly, states are left in the same position as
well-they lack jurisdiction over on-reservation water quality mat-
ters regardless of a tribal certification under the CWA. 19 1 This ap-
proach would also relieve the legal uncertainty attached to the
common law determination under the Montana line of cases. 19
2
Even if the EPA were not to revise its interpretation of section
518 of the CWA, Indian tribes have an unblemished record in
terms of EPA findings of inherent tribal authority to regulate all
reservation waters with respect to water quality. On the other
hand, the proposed reinterpretation would make the clean water
regulatory regime consistent with the Clean Air Act, increase ad-
ministrative efficiency, and reduce potential litigation.
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION.
This section unites the three parts discussed above: tribal pro-
prietary rights in water; regulatory rules governing Indian country;
and the CWA's tribal provisions. It engages potential conflicts be-
tween state and tribal water management regimes, and offers sug-
gestions for inter-governmental cooperation to provide effective
190. Interestingly, no tribe has sought authority to issue such permits. Some tribes
may feel that they get all they need by setting on-reservation water quality standards be-
cause the EPA will then issue any permits in a manner consistent with tribal standards, and
tribes receive notice of any off-reservation permits that may affect on-reservation waters. It
takes significant resources to set up a permitting system, and if the EPA already has the
administrative infrastructure, tribes may view the investment in permitting apparatus as a
low priority.
191. 40 C.F.R. § 123.1 (h) (2015). See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW,
supra note 4, at 789-90.
192. For a discussion of rules regarding agency "re-interpretation" of ambiguous
statutes see Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U§. 735, 742 (1996) ("The mere fact that an agency
position contradicts a prior agency position is not fatal."), and Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n.
v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) ("an agency must be given ample lati-
tude to 'adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances"'), and
RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.3, § 7.4 (2010). EPA may proceed
by adopting an interpretive rule, which is exempt from notice and comment requirements
of legislative rules. See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015) ("The
critical feature of interpretive rules is that they are 'issued by an agency to advise the pub-
lic of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it administers."' (citing
Shalala v. Guernsey Memonial Hospital, 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995) (noting that interpretive rules
do not require notice and comment))).
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and rational processes for water management in Indian country.
Precisely how such management would take place is highly de-
pendent on the demographics of any given reservation, the cross-
boundary nature of water resources, and relationships between
tribal, federal and state governments. Existing law, however, pro-
vides useful guideposts for the various sovereigns to consider as
they evaluate the most effective means of protecting water quality
and water use within Indian reservations. What is plain, however, is
the fact that water use regulation and water quality regulation are
complex tasks that require some governmental cooperation. For
example, in the United States v. Anderson litigation discussed above,
the on-reservation water quantification issues have been settled.
Now that someone must do the hard work of identifying and noti-
fying off-reservation groundwater users that they must limit their
withdrawals, the state government prefers to opt out and the Unit-
ed States does not want to use the court process (for which it
would pay the lion's share of cost). On the Colville Reservation,
tribal water rights have not been fully quantified, but the Tribes
have confirmed regulatory authority over non-Indian water use re-
lated to the Omak Lake drainage, and also assert authority over
other non-Indian on-reservation use. How should the regulatory
questions be addressed?
The usual starting point is the reality that Indian tribes usually
have the senior legal rights to substantial quantities of water for
consumptive and non-consumptive uses on their reservation, but
most have not received a final quantification of their rights.193 Liti-
gation to quantify reserved rights will continue, and water rights
settlements undoubtedly will be approved by Congress as agree-
ments are reached.'94 On the other hand, states have no regulatory
193. Hearing on Indian Water Rights: Promoting the Negotiation and Implementation of Wa-
ter Settlements in Indian Country: Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012)
(statement ofJohn Echohawk, Executive Director, Native American Rights Fund).
194. Id.; Indian Water Rights: Promoting the Negotiation and Implementation of Water Set-
tlementas in Indian Country: Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012) (state-
ment of David J. Hayes, Deputy Secretary, Dept. of Interior). Many of the settlements pro-
vide for regulatory regimes. See, e.g., The Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
291, Title IV § 407(0, 124 Stat. 3064 (2010) (affirming Crow Tribe regulation of tribal and
individual Indian allottee water rights as provided in the settlement codified at Mont.
Code Ann. § 85-20-901, art. IV A.2 (1999), and state regulation of state law-based rights as
provided in Mont. Code Ann. § 85-20-901, art. IV. A.3). The tribe may authorize use of the
right by the tribe itself, tribe members, or other persons, id. art. IV. B.1, and state laws re-
garding the use of water "do not apply to the Tribal water right." Id. § B.2. The Settlement
provides a model for settlement disputes between the tribe and state by the creation of a
Crow-Montana Compact Board. "The Board shall consist of three members: one member
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jurisdiction over Indian water rights.' 5 The two appellate cases
dealing with tribal regulatory authority over non-Indians on tribal
reservations reached opposite results. In its implementation of the
CWA, EPA has found that forty-nine tribes have inherent authority
to set water quality standards for reservation lakes and rivers-
including over non-Indian fee lands.'96 If the EPA interprets the
TAS provision as a delegation of authority to implement the CWA,
it will open the door for tribes who may have been reluctant to
participate due to the burden of demonstrating inherent authori-
ty. With this legal and regulatory backdrop, it makes most sense for
Indian tribes to be the lead regulatory body on Indian reservations
with respect to water permitting and water quality control. Of
course, as sovereigns, tribes may choose not to regulate certain
matters for any number of reasons-including hard choices about
the allocation of limited tribal resources.'97 For those who do seek
expansive control over reservation water resources through tribal
water codes and water quality regulation, cooperation from other
interested governments would be ideal.
While states and non-Indian property owners have frequently
resisted the exercise of tribal authority over non-members,'9 tribes
selected by the Governor of the State of Montana; one member appointed by the Crow
Tribal Chairman; and one member selected by the other two members." Mont. Code Ann.
§ 85-20-901, art. IV. F. (1999). The Board has jurisdiction of disputes arising under the
Compact, and its decisions are reviewable in "any court of competentjurisdiction"-which
is not further defined in the Compact. The White Mountain Apache Tribe Settlement Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291, Title III, § 305(e), 124 Stat. 3064, also provides for a tribal
code with authority to regulate use of tribal water rights by individuals both on the reserva-
tion and on off-reservation trust land. See atso Snake River Water Rights Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-447, Div. J, title X, § 7(b), 118 Stat. 2809, 3434 (providing for tribal code to
regulate all reserved right consumptive uses). The Fort Hall Settlement Act, Pub. L. No.
101-602, § 7(b), 104 Stat. 3062, approved the 1990 Fort Hall Indian Water Rights Agree-
ment, which provided for tribal administration of tribal rights within the reservation,
while the State of Idaho administers rights established under state law. Id. §§ 4, 8.2.1, 8.2.6,
available at http://repository.unm.edu/handle/1928/21775. The most recent example is
contained in the "Act Ratifying the Water Rights Compact entered into by the Confederat-
ed Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Montana, the State of Montana
the United States," ch. 294 (Mont. April 24, 2015), available at
http://leg.mt.gov/bills/2015/sesslaws/chO294.pdf. That Compact creates the Flathead
Reservation Water Management Board as "the exclusive regulatory body on the Reserva-
tion" for all matters related to water use and Compact interpretations on the reservation.
Id. § I.I.I. The Board has five members with two each appointed by the Tribal Council
and Governor and a fifth member selected by the other four. Id. § 2.
195. See sup/a Part IV.
196. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
197. States too, may choose not to regulate. See supra text accompanying note 141.
198. Tassie Hanna, Sam Deloria, & Charles E. Trimble, The Commission on State-Tribal
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can obviate that opposition by respecting non-Indian water rights
under tribal law. This might include recognition of state permits
when consistent with tribal regulations, or developing regulatory
regimes that provide for non-member participation. Tribal gov-
ernments are the ultimate in local control, and states should rec-
ognize the advantages that can come from cooperating with tribes
and melding technical and enforcement authority under tribal in-
stitutions. As a leading authority recently noted, conflict remains a
growth industry, ' but alternatives to litigation abound if parties
look to their substantive interests in negotiations rather than simp-
ly asserting traditional positions.'°° For many tribes, there is a
strong desire to exercise tribal authority over all on-reservation wa-
ters. But other tribes may have different priorities. Just as the deci-
sion to regulate or administer a regulatory program is an exercise
of sovereignty, so too is a decision not to regulate or to rely on a
partnership with another governmental entity. The next few para-
graphs discuss some of the interests at play when tribes prefer to
play a strong regulatory role. The political choice of whether or
not to regulate is common to all of these scenarios.
The first scenario is where the water rights of tribes and non-
Indian users have been quantified on a comprehensive basis in lit-
igation. In these situations, the decree may be the instrument of
regulation-presumably in the forum that adjudicated the dispute
if it retained jurisdiction to administer the decree. The party to the
decree who does not receive his or her entitlement can go back to
the court and ask that those with junior priorities be enjoined
from interfering with the senior right-whether it is an Indian re-
served right or a state law right.2"'
This seems to be the case with jurisdiction over water use in the
Chamokane Creek Drainage on the Spokane Reservation. Despite
the fact that all reservation waters in the middle basin of the drain-
age have been adjudicated, upstream groundwater use off the res-
Relations: Enduring Lessons in the Modern State-Tribal Relationship, 47 TULSA L. REV. 553, 557
(2012) ("As tribal governments increasingly wielded authority and resisted state jurisdic-
tion, non-Indians and some state and local officials began to push back with substantial
legal and political challenges.").
199. See ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN, xiii (3rd ed. 2011).
200. Id. at 42-57; see also Frances E. McGovern, Mediation ofthe Snake River Basin Adju-
dication, 42 IDAHO L. REv. 547 (2006) (explaining the use of various mediation theories in
reaching a complex water settlement among, federal, tribal, and state parties).
201. This assumes that the court issuing the original decree retains jurisdiction to
hear enforcement of post-decree disputes.
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ervation appears to be affecting tribal instream rights. 2 2 Here, both
the tribe and the state favor federal regulation of the groundwater
use through a federal court and its appointed water master.203 Why
is this? Actual regulation of water users is expensive, difficult, con-
troversial, and politically unpopular in the western states.2 4 For
these reasons, it may be easier to leave the regulatory duties to the
federal court and water master exercising continuing jurisdiction
over the on-reservation users to protect senior tribal instream
flows. 2 5 Moreover, there are apparently no excess on-reservation
waters for the state to regulate,2 6 and in any event the state has al-
ways deferred to the federal court-appointed water master to regu-
late any on-reservation water use.2 1' The United States, Spokane
Tribe and State of Washington appear to agree that off-reservation
groundwater use by non-parties to the litigation must be regulated.
Because the case is in federal court, the judge has authority and
discretion to tailor the process in light of the parties' needs, but
the exempt well owners are not parties to the case, and thus may
not be regulated by the federal water master absent being added to
the case as parties. If all water users in the Chamokane Creek Basin
were joined as parties, they would be subject to the court decree
and thus the authority of the water master. Short of that, it is not
clear how non-parties could be regulated absent a general adjudi-
cation filed by the state, or a more narrowly targeted suit brought
by the United States, or the tribe.08
A second scenario is where there has been no adjudication, or
only a partial adjudication of water rights on a reservation. This is
the-situation on the Colville Indian Reservation in Washington.
202. See supra text accompanying note 131-132. As noted earlier, the case was litigat-
ed in the 1970s and 1980s on the erroneous assumption that groundwater in the upper
basin was not connected to surface flows.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 135-140.
204. See Benson, supra note 40; Tarlock, supra note 40 (arguing that "priority en-
forcement is more bluff than substance").
205. See United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1366 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Central to
our decision is the fact that the interest of the state in exercising its jurisdiction will not
infringe on the tribal right to self-government nor impact on the Tribe's economic welfare
because those rights have been quantified and will be protected by the federal water mas-
ter.").
206.. Brief for Spokane Tribe of Indians at 13,,United States v. Anderson, No. CV
2:72-03643 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2015). All on-reservation surface water is necessary to sat-
isfy tribal rights set out in the decree. Id.
207. SeeOrder, supra note 132.
208. See supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text.
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The Ninth Circuit determined that the tribe has a right to water
for all practicably irrigable acreage on the reservation and for fish-
eries purposes, 2° but the Tribes' full entitlement has never been
quantified. Tribal governments in such a situation are the entities
best suited to determine allocations of tribal water rights and the
rights of tribal citizens, and a nearly per se rule forecloses state reg-
ulatory jurisdiction over tribes and their members on reserva-
210tions. In most cases, the state will have issued permits to non-
Indians, or individuals will have made claims under state common
law rules. States have done this without any legal foundation. This
was the case on the Colville Indian Reservation in the Walton litiga-
tion.1 In Walton, the Ninth Circuit denied the state's claim of au-
thority to issue water permits in No Name Creek.2 2 As a result, the
tribe now exercises exclusive authority over water use on the No
Name Creek system, and asserts authority to issue any and all per-
mits to other reservation waters.2"3 Tribes in similar situations will
need to take seriously the need to accord some respect to state wa-
ter-right-holders, and the Colville experience to date indicates that
tribe members and non-members alike comply.with the tribal reg-
209. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981).
210. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 214-15 (1987)
(state regulatoryjurisdiction over Indians on reservations allowed only under "exceptional
circumstances," or when expressly authorized by Congress); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe,
471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985) (perse rule precludes state taxation of Indians in Indian country).
The state could adjudicate all rights to the waters in the upper Columbia Basin where the
reservation is located, but such an adjudication would be very expensive and time constim-
ing. It would require a lawsuit joining all individuals and entities on and off the Colville
Reservation, who use waters from that river system. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618
(1963); see ao Dep't of Ecology v. Acquavella, 674 P.2d 160, 161 (Wash. 1983) ("A general
adjudication, pursuant to RCW 90.03, is a process whereby all those claiming the right to
use waters of a river or stream are joined in a single action to determine water rights and
priorities between claimants.") By comparison, the Yakima Basin adjudication has been
running for nearly forty years and is still not complete. See In reYakima River Drainage Ba-
sir, 296 P.3d 835, 838 (Wash. 2013).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 111-124.
212. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52-53 (9th Cir. 1981); See
supra text accompanying note 119.
213. Colville Tribal Code § 4-10-3 (2010), available at http://www.colvilletribes.com/
media/files/4-I0.pdf ("[It is] unlawful to divert or withdraw or otherwise make use of...
the waters of the Colville Reservation unless the applicable provisions of this Chapter...
have been complied with."). The tribal code also provides authority for the exchange of
permits or rights claimed under other authority (presumably state law) for tribal permits.
Id. § 4-10-281. The current Colville Tribal Water Administrator has issued over 300 permits
to non-members on the reservation for domestic and agricultural uses-some of whom
claim water rights under state law. E-mail from Lois Trevino, Colville Tribal Water Admin-
istrator, Lois Trevino to author (March 3, 2015) (on file with law review).
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ulatory regime. 1 ' Modifications in water use from those allowed
under a tribal permit are provided for under the Colville Tribal
Code.2 1'5 This is wise as tribe members and non-members alike will
be more inclined to participate willingly if they know the process is
fair and judicial review is available. 216 If non-members do not find
the tribal regime fair, there could be litigation over tribal authority
to regulate pursuant to a tribal water code, or a state might com-
mence a general stream adjudication to determine all rights in the
relevant watersheds. The Colville Tribes have a strong case for ex-
ercising their inherent authority over all water use on the reserva-
tion, and in fact, they appear to be successfully operating such a
system. Tribal members and non-members are using water pursu-
ant to tribal authority without resort to litigation because there is
good tribal governance.
A third scenario takes into account tribal exercise of control
over water quality under the CWA. The EPA has approved forty-
one sets of tribal water quality standards. 2 '7 There have been only
three challenges to tribal standards in the past twenty-four years.2 8
This indicates that there is no intense controversy over the tribes'
role in setting water quality standards. If the EPA were to re-
interpret the CWA's tribal provision as a delegation of federal au-
thority, there would be even less opportunity to dispute the juris-
dictional landscape. 29 As a result, any dispute would relate to the
214. See id. Interestingly, the Colville Tribes do not exercise TAS authority under the
Clean Water Act, although the EPA established water quality standards for reservation wa-
ters based on tribal standards. 40 C.F.R. § 131.35 (2014). EPA explained the Colville situa-
tion: "This promulgation action is unique because: (1) It was initiated before the 1987
amendments to the Clean Water Act were enacted, and (2) it is based on water quality
standards previously developed by the Colville Confederated Tribes for application to wa-
ters on their reservation. This process is not intended as a model for other reservations.
Where other Indian Tribes wish to establish standards under the CWA, EPA would expect
such Tribes to apply, under the CWA section 518 regulation, to be treated as States for
purposes of water quality standards." Water Quality Standards for the Colville Indian Res-
ervation in the State of Washington, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,622 (July 6, 1989).
215. Colville Tribal Code §§ 4-10-160, 4-10-205 (2010), available at
http://www.colvilletribes.com/media/files/4-I0.pdf.
216. Cf id. § 4-10440 (providing avenue for judicial review in tribal court). See
Hostyk, supra note 111, at 64 (suggesting recognition of tribal preeminence for on-
reservation water use, but urging intergovernmental cooperation).
217. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
218. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 748-49 (7th Cir. 2001); Montana v. EPA, 137
F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998); City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir.
1996).
219. Of course, there could be litigation over the re-interpretation itself, but for rea-
sons set forth above it seems likely that EPA would prevail. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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substance of water quality standards or the terms of permits for
point sources. Because no tribe has sought authority to issue
NPDES permits, the disputes would be limited to the validity of the
water quality standards. 22' The EPA's regulations for conflicting
state and tribal water quality standards provide an example for re-
solving tribal-state conflicts in the context of CWA programs.
In deciding whether to issue a permit for discharge within a state
that may violate the water quality standards of a downstream
tribe, the EPA may ask the parties to engage in mediation or arbi-
tration, in which the decision-maker and the EPA administrator,
who has the final authority over the issuance of the permit, will
consider such factors as "the effects of differing water quality
permit requirements on upstream and downstream dischargers,
economic impacts, and present and historical uses and quality of
the waters subject to such standards." 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e). The
EPA may then ask the tribe to issue a temporary variance from its
standards for the particular discharge or may ask the state to pro-
vide additional water pollution controls. See 54 Fed. Reg. at
39099-101; 56 Fed. Reg. at 64885-89; 40 C.F.R. §§121.11 through
121.16. This mechanism, rather than a futile effort to avoid extra-
territorial effects, is the way both Congress and the agency sought
to accommodate the inevitable differences that would arise.221
The mechanism works because Congress designated the EPA as
the final arbiter of inconsistent tribal and state water quality regu-
lations. 222 Another regulation provides for resolution of conflicts
between tribes and states that share jurisdiction over boundary wa-
ters.22' The regulation calls for mediation or arbitration, at the
election of the parties and under the auspices of the EPA, with fi-
nal decisional authority residing in the EPA.224 These sorts of dis-
pute resolution systems can work in the water quantity regulation
arena as well. All reservation water users have an interest in main-
taining clean, useable water for instream and out of stream uses,
220. See supra sources cited note 172.
221. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 74849 (7th Cir. 2001).
222. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2014) ("The Administrator shall, in promulgating such
regulations, consult affected States sharing common water bodies and provide a mecha-
nism for the resolution of any unreasonable consequences that may arise as a result of dif-
fering water quality standards that may be set by States and Indian tribes located on com-
mon bodies of water.").
223. 40 C.F.R. § 131.7 (1992). See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, su-
pra note 4, at 797-98.
224. See40 C.F.R. § 131.7, supra note 223.
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and the goal should be a regulatory system that is fair and efficient.
If a tribe exercises authority under the CWA and regulates water
use on a reservation-wide basis, it should consider devising a coop-
erative regime with neighboring jurisdictions to resolve any con-
flicts.
VII. CONCLUSION
There are few reported decisions dealing with the tribal-versus-
state authority to regulate on-reservation water use.225 Nevertheless,
many tribes assert ownership and control over all resources within
their reservations as a general matter,26 and forty-nine tribes are
recognized by the EPA as having inherent jurisdiction over reserva-
tion waters-including jurisdiction over non-members and water
use on non-member fee lands.2 ' The fact that such tribes may
clearly regulate non-members under the CWA, and may comple-
ment that authority with a comprehensive water code, makes a
powerful case for tribal authority over the use of all reservation wa-
ters. Under these circumstances, tribes and states should consider
the following propositions.
First, all parties should recognize that Indian tribes and their
members have paramount rights to the use of some if not all reser-
vation water resources. Second, many non-Indians have acquired
fee simple land within Indian reservations and use water under
tribal or state law, or both. Third, scarcity of water for new uses
and controversy over changes in existing uses involve sensitive is-
sues for policy-makers to consider. Tribal governments are best po-
sitioned to make such policy judgments and enforce local regula-
tions within their reservation homelands. This is consistent with
the original promises embodied in treaties, executive orders, and
other agreements setting aside tribal lands for permanent tribal
occupation. At the same time, vacillating federal policies resulted
in non-Indian land ownership within reservations. Where non-
members have acquired water permits or other claims to water un-
der state law, tribes should honor those claims to the extent con-
sistent with tribal water rights and policies. This may be a relaxa-
tion of full tribal sovereignty over water uses, but it may be worth it
as a way to avoid lengthy and costly litigation-litigation that may
225. See supra text accompanying notes 111-114.
226. See supra note 55.
227. See supra note 172.
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resolve only the particular case and leave future outcomes uncer-
tain. Through such a process, tribes could bring non-Indian water
users into a comprehensive tribal system designed to allow for wa-
ter use consistent with settled expectations, but be mindful of the
need for environmental protection and changing needs of reserva-
tion communities. Of course, state cooperation (or at least non-
opposition) will be necessary for such a regime to work, and not
devolve into litigation.
The Secretary of the Interior should lift the moratorium on
tribal water code approval, but in doing so could suggest that the
approval process will consider how a tribal applicant will treat cur-
rently exercised state water rights-if any exist. This would move
the discussion over tribal regulatory power from a judicially super-
vised contest to a process that considers the interests of the parties,
rather than simply their legal positions. It would also put the Sec-
retary in the prope'r position of facilitating tribal self-
determination, and promoting effective water management as op-
posed to standing as an obstacle to these ends.
At the end of the day, it is tribal governments that must decide
whether to assert some or all of their regulatory authority over wa-
ter use and water quality. States must decide whether it is in their
interest to cooperate with tribal efforts, or enter the labyrinth of
litigation over tribal regulatory power. The EPA's current position
regarding inherent tribal authority argues in favor of recognizing
tribal authority where it is asserted. But any regulatory regime re-
quires a substantial commitment of resources, and can be aided by
efforts at inter-governmental cooperation. Reconciliation of inter-
ests in this area should be the goal to ensure efficient use of scarce
reservation water resources while maintaining water quality.
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